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THE SCOPE OF LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 12
OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933:
"PARTICIPATION" AND THE PERTINENT
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS
Douglas E. Abrams*
I. Introduction
Section 12 of the Securities Act of 19331 creates two private rights
of action, each providing in relevant part that "[a]ny person who
offers or sells a security ...shall be liable to the person purchasing
such security from him .... ",2 Because suit may be maintained
only by the person who purchases the security from defendant,3 an
offeror may incur section 12 liability only if the offeror also "sells"
the security to the plaintiff.4 Section 12(1) imposes liability on any
seller whose offer or sale violates the Act's registration or prospectus
requirements found in section 5;1 section 12(2) imposes liability on
any seller who makes an offer or sale' by means of a materially
misleading prospectus or oral communication.6
At the least, the Act confers seller status on the transferor, the
party who transfers title to or other interest in the security for
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 1973,
Wesleyan University; J.D., 1976 Columbia University School of Law.
I would like to thank my research assistant, Francis Marinelli of Fordham's
Class of 1987, and faculty secretary Mary L. Whelan.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982) [hereinafter the 1933 Act or the Act].
2. Id. § 771. See infra text accompanying note 268 for the section quoted in
full.
3. Courts agree that to maintain a section 12 claim, the plaintiff must have
purchased the security in question. E.g., Bosse v. Crowell Collier & MacMillan,
565 F.2d 602, 610 & n.12 (9th Cir. 1977); Thomas v. Roblin Indus., Inc., 520
F.2d 1393, 1396 (3d Cir. 1975); Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 622 (5th
Cir. 1973); Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 790 (8th Cir. 1967);
Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596, 603 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other
grounds, 383 U.S. 363 (1966); Monetary Management Group of St. Louis, Inc. v.
Kidder, Peabody & Co., 604 F. Supp. 764, 766 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Nick v. Shearson/
Am. Express, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D. Minn. 1984); American Nursing Care
of Toledo, Inc. v. Leisure, 609 F. Supp. 419, 429 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Glusband
v. Fittin Cunningham Lauzon, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 145, 149-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
4. See supra notes 269-72 and accompanying text.
5. See 1933 Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982).
6. Id. § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982). Section 15 of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77o (1982), imposes secondary liability on a person who controls a liable section
12 defendant. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
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value.7 Since 1971, however, seven circuits have adopted the "par-
ticipation" theory. Courts adopting this theory impose section 12
liability not only on the transferor, but also on any person "whose
participation in the buy-sell transaction is a substantial factor in
causing the transaction to take place." 8
This term the Supreme Court may speak about the participation
theory for the first time. The Court will review Dahl v. Pinter,9
which held that even where a non-transferor's activities are a sub-
stantial factor in causing the underlying sale to take place, the non-
transferor incurs section 12 liability as a "participant" in the selling
effort only when the non-transferor was motivated by a desire to
provide a direct or indirect benefit to someone other than the
purchaser.
Part II of this Article traces the participation theory's unusual
development in the lower courts. The theory is derived from Lennerth
v. Mendenhall,0 a 1964 district court decision that imposed section
12 liability on the issuer that transferred title to unregistered se-
curities, and on three individual defendants who had solicited the
purchasers and negotiated the underlying sales for the issuer. Len-
nerth held that the three individual defendants had "participated to
a culpable degree"" in the issuer's selling effort because, "[tlo borrow
a phrase from the law of negligence," the plaintiffs' injury "flow[ed]
directly and proximately"'' 2 from the activities of these individual
defendants. Except for stating the conclusion that the participation
theory was consistent with the securities acts' "liberal remedial
spirit,"" the court did not base the theory on interpretation of
section 12's pertinent legislative materials-the section's language and
7. Section 2(3) of the 1933 Act provides that "[tihe term 'sale' or 'sell' shall
include every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security,
for value." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1982). This Article presumes that a sale has taken
place and determines who may incur section 12 liability as one who sells the security.
It is this Article's thesis that section 12's two subsections impose liability on only
the person who, by contract of sale or by disposition, transfers title to or other
interest in the security for value. The Article sometimes refers to this person as
"the transferor" and sometimes refers to any other person as a "non-transferor."
8. Dahl v. Pinter, 787 F.2d 985, 990 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc denied,
794 F.2d 1016 (1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1885 (1987); see also infra notes
57, 85-88 and accompanying text. See infra notes 77-84, 406 and accompanying
text for discussion of Dahl.
9. Dahl, 787 F.2d 985.
10. 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964). See infra notes 48-56 and accompanying
text for discussion of Lennerth.
11. 234 F. Supp. at 63.
12. Id. at 65.
13. Id.; see also id. at 64 (discussing "the spirit of the [securities] acts").
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legislative history, the securities acts' legislative scheme, and the 1933
Act's regulatory antecedents. Because Congress enacted each of the
seven securities acts14 as part of a unified regulatory program, the
Supreme Court construes the acts as in pari materia-having the
same purpose or object-and thus as a legislative scheme yielding
persuasive sources of mutual comparison and contrast. When con-
struction of a 1933 Act provision is at issue, the Court frequently
seeks comparison and contrast in the 1929 Uniform Sale of Securities
Act and the pre-1933 blue sky laws, regulatory antecedents whose
strengths and weaknesses influenced the drafters and enactors of the
initial federal act.' 5
In Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, Inc. in
1971,16 the Fifth Circuit cited Lennerth and became the first of seven
circuits to adopt the participation theory. Except for embracing
Lennerth's conclusion that section 12 participant liability is consistent
with the securities acts' remedial purposes,' 7 Hill York and subsequent
influential Fifth Circuit decisions did not base the theory on inter-
pretation of the section's pertinent legislative materials.
The other six circuits have adopted the participation theory in
much the same cursory manner. Without otherwise interpreting sec-
tion 12's pertinent legislative materials, the other circuits have adopted
the theory by citing Lennerth, by citing one or more of the Fifth
Circuit precedents, or by stating conclusions of their own concerning
the securities acts' remedial purposes.'" In five of these other six
circuits, adoption of the theory came with discussion of two par-
agraphs or less;' 9 the sixth engaged in lengthier discussion but based
its holding on conclusions concerning remedial purpose and on "[t]he
14. The first six securities acts were enacted between 1933 and 1940: 1933 Act
§ -Schedules A, B, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, §§ 1-35, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) [hereinafter the 1934 Act]; Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, §§ 1-33, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1982) [hereinafter
the 1935 Act]; Trust Indenture Act of 1939, §§ 301-328, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-79bbbb
(1982) [hereinafter the 1939 Act]; Investment Company Act of 1940, §§ 1-65, 15
U.S.C. 88 80a-I to 80a-64 (1982); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 88 201-222,
15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1982). The seventh securities act was enacted in 1970.
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, §§ l(a)-12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1982)
[hereinafter the 1970 Act]; see also 1934 Act § 21(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g) (1982)
(as amended, defining "securities laws" to include these seven acts).
15. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. This Article sometimes refers to
the Uniform Sale of Securities Act as the Uniform Act.
16. 448 F.2d 680, 686 (5th Cir. 1971). See infra notes 59-69 and accompanying
text for discussion of Hill York.
17. 448 F.2d at 692-93.
18. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
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better reasoned cases," including Lennerth and several of the Fifth
Circuit decisions. 20
Lennerth and its progeny thus have assumed proportions as an
apparently formidable body of doctrine, a circumstance that some-
times invites ongoing invocation of stare decisis rather than pause
for statutory interpretation. Despite their apparent proportions, how-
ever, the participation decisions since the early 1970's have not moved
significantly beyond Lennerth's reasoning, which was grounded in
conclusions concerning remedial purpose otherwise unaccompanied
by interpretation of section 12's pertinent legislative materials. The
development of participant liability is striking because, as Part II of
the Article shows, during this period the Supreme Court has ascertained
the meaning of securities provisions by closely interpreting the various
sources of congressional intent. The Court has refused to expand
the scope of securities remedies beyond the limits indicated by these
sources, whether by invoking remedial construction or by applying
common law tort principles.
In statutory decisionmaking, the judicial role is to ascertain and
apply legislative intent. When dispute concerns the scope of a right
of action created by a remedial statute such as the 1933 Act, a
court ascertains this scope more accurately by closely interpreting
the various sources of intent than by merely stating a conclusion
based on remedial purpose. Part III interprets section 12's pertinent
legislative materials and presents this Article's thesis that despite the
1933 Act's status as remedial legislation, section 12's two subsections
do not impose liability on participants or other nontransferors.
As a threshold matter, Part III establishes that Congress did
not intend to impose section 12 liability for "participating" in a
selling effort, no matter how courts might determine participation
and no matter what an alleged participant's motive might have been.
Section 12's language yields no indication of congressional intent to
impose liability for participation, and the section's legislative history
makes no mention of participation. In the face of this silence, the
legislative scheme and the 1933 Act's regulatory antecedents become
instructive.
As section 12 did four years later, the 1929 Uniform Act created
private rights of action for fraudulent sales of securities or sales in
violation of registration requirements. The Uniform Act expressly
imposed liability on the seller and on persons who "personally
20. Davis v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1065-67 (6th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 (1985). See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text
for discussion of the decisions in the six circuits.
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participated" with the seller in making a sale.21- By the time Congress
began considering federal securities legislation early in 1933, the blue
sky laws of twelve states and the territory of Hawaii had created
private rights of action that expressly imposed liability on persons
who "participated" in making fraudulent or violative sales. Liabilities
and obligations expressly grounded in participation are found else-
where in the 1933 Act and in four of the later five Roosevelt
administration securities acts. Section 9 of the 1934 Act, enacted
by the same Congress that enacted the 1933 Act, creates a private
right of action that expressly imposes liability on participants.The legislative scheme and the 1933 Act's regulatory antecedents
thus demonstrate that Congress knew of the participation concept
and employed it in the Act and throughout the unified program of
securities regulation. In this context, section 12's failure to impose
liability expressly for participation supports the conclusion that Con-
gress did not intend that the section impose participant liability.
Part III also establishes that the 1933 Act confers seller status,
and thus imposes section 12 liability, on only the person who transfers
title to or other interest in the security for value. The Act's language
indicates, but does not conclusively establish, this outcome. The
Act's legislative history does not shed light on who may be a statutory
seller. Section 11, however, authorizes and effectuates actions by
"any person acquiring [the] security" against a wide array of ex-
pressly enumerated defendants, including most of the major non-
transferors involved in registered offerings. 22 These non-transferors
are among the persons frequently named as "participants" in section
12 actions. Section 12 could have provided a similar enumeration
but instead provides that "[a]ny person who offers or sells a security
... shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from
him." ' 23 Section 11 thus creates a legislative scheme whose contrasts
with section 12 support the conclusion that the Act does not impose
seller status on non-transferors.
Because transactions in registered and unregistered securities are
frequently effected by non-transferors with the transferor playing
only a nominal role, limiting section 12 liability to the transferor
would significantly diminish the protections afforded by the 1933
Act. 24 The defect lies in the statute itself. The scope of section 12
liability should be determined by congressional reexamination of the
extent of protection that best effectuates the securities acts' remedial
21. See infra notes 292-94 and accompanying text.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982).
23. Id. § 771.
24. See infra notes 429-32 and accompanying text.
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purposes in light of the complexity and variety that characterize
present-day securities transactions. Liability should no longer be
determined by judicial implication based on a theory that is incon-
sistent with the section's pertinent legislative materials.
Perhaps because seven circuits impose section 12 liability for sub-
stantial participation in a selling effort, courts have not paid sig-
nificant attention to the question whether liability may be imposed
for aiding and abetting in section 12 actions. 25 If this Article's thesis
is adopted, however, non-transferors would no longer be subject to
section 12 liability as sellers. In that event, purchasers could be
expected to sue some non-transferors as aider-abettors who had
substantially assisted primary violations. Part III therefore briefly
discusses section 12 aiding and abetting liability. This Article's analysis
provides support for the conclusion that courts may not impose liability
under section 12 for aiding and abetting a seller's section 5 violation
or its offer or sale of a security by means of a materially misleading
prospectus or oral communication.
II. Judicial Interpretation of Securities Provisions
Section 12 decisions adopting the participation theory since the
early 1970's have not moved significantly beyond Lennerth's rea-
soning, which was grounded in conclusions concerning the securities
acts' remedial purposes otherwise unaccompanied by interpretation
of section 12's pertinent legislative materials. By significant contrast,
the Supreme Court during this period has ascertained the meaning
of securities provisions by closely interpreting the various sources
of congressional intent. The Court has refused to expand the scope
of securities remedies beyond the limits indicated by these sources,
whether by invoking remedial construction or by applying common
law tort principles.
A. Of Hunters and Traps: Section 12's Participation Theory in
the Lower Courts
1. The Genesis of Participant Liability
Seven years after the enactment of the 1933 Act, the First Circuit
decided Cady v. Murphy,26 which affirmed imposition of section
25. For the elements of an aiding and abetting cause of action, see infra note
410.
26. 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
[Vol. XV
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12(2) liability on a brokerage firm. The plaintiff had purchased
securities after engaging in telephone negotiations with the defendant
firm's head trader, who misrepresented material facts concerning the
securities and the issuer. 27 At trial, the parties disputed whether the
firm had effected the underlying transaction as a principal or as a
broker for the transferor. 21 Sitting without a jury, the district court
determined that resolution of the dispute was "immaterial ' 29 because
" '[s]ection 12 ... applies to brokers when selling securities owned
by other persons.' "0 The court found no legislative history or case
law regarding the question whether, as the defendant firm argued,
Congress intended section 12 to reach only transferors.31 The court
based its holding on an interpretation of the language of the Act.32
A divided court of appeals affirmed. The majority concluded that
the district court's holding was "not a strained interpretation""3 of
the 1933 Act because section 12's two subsections each imposed
liability on "[a]ny person who sells a security" and section 2(3) of
the Act defined "sell" to include "solicitation of an offer to buy." '3 4
The panel held that when the defendant firm solicited an offer from
plaintiff to buy the securities, the firm was a "person who sells a
security." 3 The firm thus incurred section 12(2) liability for material
misrepresentations even if it acted only as a broker for the transferor.
Throughout the 1950's and early 1960's, a few decisions approved
imposition of section 12 liability on defendants who were not trans-
ferors or brokers, but who had involved themselves in a transferor's
selling effort. Unlike Cady, these decisions did not base their holdings
on interpretation of statutory language. Instead the decisions pin-
27. 113 F.2d at 989.
28. See Murphy v. Cady, 30 F. Supp. 466, 469 (D. Me. 1939), aff'd, 113 F.2d
988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
29. 30 F. Supp. at 469.
30. Id., quoted in Cady, 113 F.2d at 990.
31. 30 F. Supp. at 469.
32. Id. at 469-70.
33. 113 F.2d at 990. The dissenter concluded that the evidence indicated that
the defendant was a broker for the purchaser. Id. at 991.
34. Id. at 990; 1933 Act ch. 38, 48 Stat. 84 (1933). In 1954 Congress redefined
the terms "sale" and "sell" in section 2(3) "to exclude offers." See H.R. REP.
No. 1542, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1954); see also Pub. L. No. 577, ch. 667, 68
Stat. 683 (1954). The 1954 amendments also made a conforming change in section
12. For the full text of amended section 12, see infra note 268 and accompanying
text. For discussion of amended section 2(3) with its present distinction between
sales and offers, see infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
35. 113 F.2d at 990; see also Wall v. Wagner, 125 F. Supp. 854, 858 (D. Neb.
1954) (citing Cady and finding transferor's agent to be section 12(1) seller), aff'd
without considering the question sub nom. Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F.2d 868 (8th
Cir. 1955).
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pointed "participation" as the basis of liability without citing Cady,
without identifying the source of participant liability, and without
articulating a standard for determining the point at which partici-
pation became sufficient to support liability.
In Wonneman v. Stratford Securities Co.,36 for example, the plain-
tiff on two occasions purchased unregistered securities from Strat-
ford, a brokerage firm that made the sales as a principal after having
purchased the securities on the open market. The section 12(1) count
named not only Stratford, but also the issuer and some individual
employees of the issuer and of Stratford. 37
Judge Cashin denied the summary judgment motion made by two
individual defendants. Without interpreting section 12's pertinent
legislative materials, the court held that to avoid section 12(1) liability,
these defendants "must show that they did not participate in the
sale and not merely that they did not actually sell the securities to
plaintiff. ' 3 The court identified the "problem" 3 9 inherent in de-
termining the quality of the individual defendants' showing:
What constitutes "participation"? Does one who supervises the
selling operations "participate" in an individual sale? Does one
who composes advertising material "participate" in the sale? Does
a director or an officer "participate" in the sale?-
After trial, Judge Murphy imposed liability on one individual
defendant as a controlling person of the liable Stratford. 4' Without
interpreting section 12's pertinent legislative materials, he dismissed
the complaint against the other individual defendants on the ground
that section 12 liability extended only to plaintiff's "seller ... [and]
those in privity with that seller, ' 42 such as "one who negotiated the
sale." 43
Without evident limitation, other courts stated the broad view of
section 12 participant liability found in the first Wonneman decision. 44
36. [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,923 (S.D.N.Y.
June 26, 1959), after trial, id. 91,034 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1961).
37. Id. 90,923, at 92,963; id. 91,034, at 93,459. For the full text of section
12(1), see infra text accompanying note 268.
38. [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,923, at 92,963
(S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1959).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id. 91,034, at 93,459 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1961). For discussion of 1933
Act controlling-person liability, see infra note 229.
42. [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,034, at 93,461
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1961).
43. Id. at 93,459.
44. See, e.g., MacClain v. Bules, 275 F.2d 431, 433 (8th Cir. 1960) (stating
[Vol. XV
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In Freed v. Szabo Food Service, Inc. (Szabo), 45 for example, plaintiffs
purchased stock in Chemoil Industries, Inc. (Chemoil) and in the
defendant company, the surviving entity of a merger between Chemoil
and Szabo Food Service, Inc. (Old Szabo). After the Chemoil and
Old Szabo managements reached an informal merger agreement,
certain of the companies' employees began a campaign to stimulate
the market in Chemoil shares and thus help assure that Chemoil
shareholders would approve the merger. These employees dissemi-
nated documents containing material misrepresentations concerning
the merger and the companies. The price of Chemoil shares doubled,
and Chemoil shareholders voted to approve the merger. The plain-
tiffs alleged that they purchased Chemoil and Szabo shares (apparently
from transferors not named in the complaint) at artificially high
prices.
The court denied Szabo's motion to dismiss the section 12(2) claim.
Except for stating the conclusion that "the securities laws are remedial
and are to be construed liberally in order to achieve the congressional
purpose, ' 46 the court did not interpret section 12's pertinent legislative
materials. The court held that "[tihe fact that there is no privity
will not defeat the action as long as plaintiffs' alleged purchase was
in reliance upon misrepresentation and participation in these mis-
representations by the defendant. ' 47 Nearly seven months later, the
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio decided Lennerth
v. Mendenhall.48
t
that district court had refused to impose section 12 liability on banker because
"the evidence did not sufficiently establish that he had been a participant in"
underlying sale); Davidson v. Amos Treat & Co., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,350, at 94,494 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1964) ("[b]oth the
seller ... and its employee . . . , who participated in the sale, would be liable
[under section 12(2)] for any false oral statement made by" employee); Zachman
v. Erwin, 186 F. Supp. 691, 695-96 (S.D. Tex. 1960) (" 'Securities Act only imposes
liability for selling a security under Section [12] and for controlling a seller under
Section [15] .... [Ilt cannot be said that [defendant] participated in a sale or
controlled a seller' ") (quoting Zachman v. Erwin, 186 F. Supp. 681, 686 (S.D.
Tex. 1959)); First Trust & Say. Bank v. Fidelity-Phila. Trust Co., 112 F. Supp.
761, 769-70, 771 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (plaintiff claimed that defendant bank was section
12 seller because "it participated in the sale of securities"; court held that bank
"did not become a seller or participate in the sale of securities by acting as a
stakeholder of the collateral and as a forwarding bank for collection of drafts"),
aff'd, 214 F.2d 320 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 856 (1954).
45. [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,317 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 14, 1964).
46. Id. at 94,363-65.
47. Id.
48. 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
1987]
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2. Lennerth and the Participation Theory
Lennerth v. Mendenhall imposed section 12(1) liability not only
on the issuer that transferred title to unregistered securities, but also
on the issuer's president and vice president and another employee.49
The other employee, one Roger, had solicited the plaintiffs and had
met with them on three occasions to discuss the issuer's condition and
to describe the operation that the securities would help finance. The
vice president, "who represented the symbol of authority which
Roger said he lacked," had attended the third meeting to assist in
the negotiations. The president, for his part, had signed the contract
of sale in the issuer's name.5 0
In resolving "the problem of 'participation' "I raised by such
decisions as Wonneman and Szabo, Lennerth stated that the outer
limits of section 12 liability "must lie somewhere between the narrow
view, which holds only the parties to the sale, and the too-liberal
view which would hold all who remotely participated in the events
leading up to the transaction. ' '1 2 Lennerth crafted a participation
theory grounded in common law tort principles:
We think that the line of demarcation must be drawn in terms
of cause and effect: To borrow a phrase from the law of neg-
ligence, did the injury to the plaintiff flow directly and proximately
from the actions of this particular defendant? If the answer is
in the affirmative, we would hold him liable. But for the presence
of the defendant ... in the negotiations preceding the sale, could
the sale have been consummated? If the answer is in the negative,
and we find that the transaction could never have materialized
without the efforts of [the] defendant, we must find him guilty."
The court imposed section 12(1) liability on the three individual
defendants because "as a matter of uncontroverted fact [each had]
participated to a culpable degree in either the offer to sell, or the
sale, or both. '54 Reasoning metaphorically that "[tihe hunter who
seduces the prey and leads it to the trap he has set is no less guilty
than the hunter whose hand springs the snare,"" the court held
that each individual defendant's conduct was "tantamount to that
49. Id. at 65-66.
50. Id. at 64, 66.
51. Id. at 64.
52. Id. at 65.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 63-64; see also id. at 65-66 (finding vice president's participation
"indispensable to the final outcome").
55. Id. at 65.
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of a 'seller' within the liberal remedial spirit of the securities laws." '5 6
Except for stating this conclusion that its participation theory was
consistent with the securities acts' remedial purposes, the court did
not base the theory on an interpretation of section 12's pertinent
legislative materials.
Between 1971 and 1981, a series of Fifth Circuit decisions adopted
and then recast Lennerth's theory for determining the outer limits
of section 12 liability. 7 These influential Fifth Circuit decisions pin-
pointed "participation" as the basis of liability.58 Except for em-
bracing Lennerth's conclusion that the participation theory is consis-
tent with the securities acts' remedial purposes, the decisions did not
base the theory on an interpretation of section 12's pertinent legislative
materials.
The first of the Fifth Circuit series, Hill York Corp. v. American
International Franchises, Inc., 9 concerned a pyramid scheme to sell
restaurant franchises through corporations established by three in-
dividual defendants in defined geographic areas. The defendants
solicited local investors to form the corporations and to serve as officers
and directors. Each corporation had five directors, two of whom
were elected by the defendants. To finance the purchase from defend-
ants of the right to sell franchises, each corporation transferred its
unregistered stock to a small number of persons in what were later
56. Id.; see also id. at 64 (discussing "the spirit of the [securities] Acts").
57. See, e.g., Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1360 (5th Cir. 1981) ("those
'whose participation in the buy-sell transaction is a substantial factor in causing
the transaction to take place' are classified as sellers under Section 12") (quoting
Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir. 1980)); Swenson v. Engelstad, 626
F.2d 421, 426 (5th Cir. 1980) (persons who "participate in the negotiations of or
arrangements for the sale of unregistered securities" are section 12(l) sellers if they
meet substantial-factor test); Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709, 713-14 (5th Cir.
1980) (quoting passage from Pharo, restated supra, in section 12(2) action); Lewis
v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 621-22 (5th Cir. 1973) (test under section 12(1)
"to determine whether a participant in the arrangements for a sale 'sells' securities
... is whether the party is the 'proximate cause' of the sale"); Hill York Corp.
v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 692 (5th Cir. 1971) (in action
under subsections (1) and (2) of section 12, rejecting "the overbroad 'participation'
concept which would hold all those liable who participated in the events leading
up to the transaction"); see also Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d
534, 551 n.27 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting passage from Pharo, restated supra), affd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Ayers v. Wolfinbarger,
491 F.2d 8, 13-14 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting Hill York passage, restated supra, in
section 12(2) action); Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F. Supp. 282, 287 (E.D.
La. 1974) (section 12(2) liability extends to persons who "participated in some
significant way in a sales effort"), aff'd per curiam, 512 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1975).
58. See supra note 57.
59. 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
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determined to be unlawful private placements. 6° The plaintiffs were
among the purchasers of one corporation's stock. The defendants never
met the plaintiffs before their purchases, but they instructed local cor-
porate officers about solicitation techniques and provided sales lit-
erature that contained materially misleading information.6'
Hill York held that the three non-transferor defendants were "sell-
ers" from whom the plaintiffs had purchased the securities and thus
were liable under sections 12(1) and 12(2). 62 After rejecting "the
overbroad 'participation' concept which would hold all those liable
who participated in the events leading up to the transaction," 63 the
panel cited Lennerth and "adopt[ed]" 64 its participation theory as
"the proper test ' 65 and "a rational and workable standard for
imposition of liability under either section." 66 Because the three
defendants were "the motivating force ' 67 behind the underlying sales
and because each had acted as a "hunter who seduces the prey and
leads it to the trap,"16 the panel concluded that the three defendants
were sellers within the theory's "letter and spirit." '
69
When two causes concur to bring about an event and either,
operating alone, would have been sufficient to cause the identical
result, tort law recognizes the need for a test other than the but-
for test applied in Lennerth and Hill York.70 The substantial-factor
test has won general acceptance. A defendant's conduct is a cause
of the event if the conduct was a material element and a substantial
factor in bringing about the event. 71 In 1973, in Lewis v. Walston
& Co.,72 the Fifth Circuit imposed section 12(1) liability on a non-
transferor defendant whose activities were a substantial factor in
causing the plaintiffs to purchase unregistered securities.
60. Id. at 684-85.
61. Id. at 686.
62. Id. at 692-93, 695. On their section 12 claims, plaintiffs had won a jury
verdict against the corporate issuer and the three individual defendants. The issuer
did not appeal. Id. at 686.
63. Id. at 692.
64. Id. at 693.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 692.
67. Id. at 693.
68. Id. (quoting Lennerth, 234 F. Supp. at 65).
69. Id.
70. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 266-67 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER &
KEETON]; see also, 4 F. HARPER, F. JAMEs & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.6(6),
at 180-82 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter HARPER, JAMES & GRAY].
71. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 70, § 41, at 266-67.
72. 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973).
[Vol. XV
SECTION 12 LIABILITY
The non-transferor defendant in Lewis was a registered broker's
representative who, during five months of communication with the
plaintiffs, repeatedly touted the unregistered stock of a company that
ultimately went into receivership. After touting the stock as a "po-
tential IBM ' 73 and after falsely stating that 'the broker would take
a position in the issuer, the defendant arranged meetings with the
issuer's officers at which the two plaintiffs made a series of purchases.
The defendant continued touting the stock to the plaintiffs until they
made all their purchases, and she procured most of the purchase price
for them by selling listed securities in their accounts. 74 Citing Lennerth
and Hill York," the court of appeals affirmed imposition of section
12 liability on the defendant because her "participa[tion] in the
negotiations . . . [or] .. .arrangements" was "a 'substantial factor'
in bringing about the plaintiffs' purchases" of the unregistered
securities .76
Presently before the Supreme Court is Dahl v. Pinter,77 the Fifth
Circuit's latest section 12 participation decision. Pinter transferred
unregistered fractional undivided interests in oil and gas leases to
Dahl, who then solicited the other ten plaintiffs, all of whom were
either friends or family members. Motivated by a desire to benefit
the other plaintiffs, Dahl did not receive or expect to receive any
commission in connection with the purchases they later made from
the transferor. 8 When the securities proved worthless, Dahl and the
other plaintiffs alleged that Pinter had violated section 12(1) by fail-
ing to register the securities.79
A divided Fifth Circuit panel rejected Pinter's contention that Dahl
was liable under section 12(1) as a participant in the sales to the
other plaintiffs. The majority concluded that although Dahl's ac-
tivities were a substantial factor in causing the other plaintiffs'
purchases to take place, he was not a seller under the participation
73. Id. at 619.
74. Id. at 620.
75. Id. at 621.
76. Id. at 621-22.
77. 787 F.2d 985 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc denied, 794 F.2d 1016 (1986),
cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1885 (1987).
78. Dahl, 787 F.2d at 986 & n.l. Dahl knew that the fractional undivided
interests were unregistered, but no evidence indicated that he knew that failure to
register violated the 1933 Act. Id. at 987. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's judgment rejecting Pinter's contention that Dahl should be barred from
any recovery under the equitable doctrines of in pari delicto, estoppel and unclean
hands. See id. at 987-89.
79. Id. at 987.
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theory which the circuit's decisions had "created." 80 Because "a
rule imposing liability . . . on friends and family members who give
one another gratuitous advice on investment matters unreasonably
interferes with well-established patterns of social discourse,"'" the
majority held that section 12 participant liability may be imposed
only on a non-transferor who meets the substantial-factor test and
who was "motivated by a desire to confer a direct or indirect benefit
on someone other than the person he has advised to purchase. ' 8 2
The majority was not persuaded by dissenting Judge John R. Brown,
who argued that imposition of section 12 liability premised on motive
"is wholly without support in law and flies in the face of the policy
underlying the securities registration laws. '"83 According to Judge
Brown, a distinction based on motive "has no more foundation in
securities law and policy than a distinction based on the color of
the seller's hair or the size of his tennis shoes." ' 84
In adopting the participation theory, the Fifth Circuit has been
joined by six 85 of the other eight circuits that have considered the
80. Id. at 991.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 992 (Brown, J., dissenting).
84. Id.; see also Dahl v. Pinter, 794 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1986) (Jones,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (distinction based on motive "has
absolutely no foundation in either settled securities law or its underlying policies").
85. The Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh circuits have adopted
the theory. The Second Circuit has not specified application of the substantial-
factor test. See Akerman v. Oryx Communications, Inc., 810 F.2d 336, 344 (2d
Cir. 1987) ("person who makes a misrepresentation may be held liable as a [section
12(2)] 'participant' even though he is not the immediate and direct seller of the
securities ... [but] only if there is proof of scienter"); Mayer v. Oil Field Sys.
Corp., 803 F.2d 749, 756 (2d Cir. 1986) ("when ... the person who made the
misrepresentation is not the immediate and direct seller .... the imposition of
liability on him under § 12(2) as a participant ... requires proof of scienter").
The circuit's district courts, however, apply the substantial-factor test. See, e.g.,
Klein v. Computer Devices, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 837, 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (section
12(2) purchaser may sue "those who substantially participated in the transaction").
The Fourth and Sixth circuits apply the substantial-factor test. See Adalman v.
Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359, 363 (4th Cir. 1986) ("this Circuit has ...
allowed a plaintiff to sue a defendant under § 12(2) where that defendant is a
'significant participant' in, or one who 'proximately caused,' a sale of securities
.... [S]tatus . . . as a 'seller' of securities should be determined by whether the
entity was a 'substantial factor' in the sale of securities"); Davis v. Avco Fin.
Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1067 (6th Cir. 1984) (imposing section 12(2) liability
on "participants in the selling effort whose acts meet the substantial factor test"),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 (1985); Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1287 (4th
Cir. 1978) (section 12(1) liability extends to "all persons whose actions are a
substantial factor in causing a purchaser to buy a security").
The Eighth Circuit initially expressed "difficulty" with the Lennerth-Hill York
but-for test on the ground that "it fails to elucidate or focus the trier of fact's
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theory.8" In circuits in which the theory remains an open question,
attention on those policies which the [1933] Act was designed to implement."
Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d 879, 886 (8th Cir. 1977). In 1981, however, the circuit
adopted the substantial-factor test without citing Wasson. See Stokes v. Lokken,
644 F.2d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 1981) (section 12(1) or 12(2) liability extends to "one
whose participation in the buy-sell transaction is a substantial factor in causing
the transaction to take place"). In section 12 decisions since Stokes, district courts
in the Eighth Circuit have applied the substantial-factor test. See, e.g., Briggs v.
Sterner, 529 F. Supp. 1155, 1173 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (approving imposition of section
12(1) liability on "persons . . . whose participation in the sale of securities was a
substantial factor in its ultimate consummation").
The Ninth Circuit imposes section 12 liability on " 'participants' whose acts are
'both necessary to and a substantial factor in the sales transaction.' " Anderson
v. Aurotek, 774 F.2d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d
633, 649-50 (9th Cir. 1980), which discussed liability under section 12(1) and 12(2));
accord SEC v. Rogers, 790 F.2d 1450, 1456 n.8 (9th Cir. 1986). Rogers stated
that the "necessary" and "substantial factor" prongs require separate showings:
"The first prong . . . requires a defendant's participation to be a 'but for' cause
of the unlawful sale, and the second requires the participation to be more than
'de minimus.' " Id. at 1456.
Aurotek and Rogers follow a brief interlude marked by apparent misgivings. In
1982, two years after Murphy, the Ninth Circuit expressed approval of section 12
participant liability but noted that "the broad reading of 'seller' may be in some
doubt in light of recent Supreme Court cases that prescribe a strict statutory
construction approach to the securities acts and reject their expansion with tort
and criminal theories." Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289, 1294 & n.3 (9th
Cir. 1982). A month later, in a decision that cited neither Murphy nor Admiralty
Fund, a different panel affirmed entry of summary judgment against a purchaser
who had failed to establish the "privity ... required by § 12." Feldman v. Simkins
Indus., Inc., 679 F.2d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1982). Citing Murphy but not Simkins,
Rogers stated that "[uinder section 12 .... the necessary and substantial participant
test has been uniformly applied." 790 F.2d at 1456 n.8. Ninth Circuit district
courts apply the substantial-factor test. E.g., In re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F.
Supp. 415, 420 (N.D. Cal. 1985) ("Ninth Circuit has adopted the 'substantial
participation' test ... to analyze 'seller' status under § 12," citing Fifth Circuit
precedent).
In the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit decisions cited supra note 57 constitute
binding precedent. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994, divided the Fifth Circuit into two circuits, the
Eleventh and the "new Fifth." Decisions handed down by the Fifth Circuit before
the close of business on September 30, 1981, constitute binding precedent in the
Eleventh Circuit's court of appeals, district courts and bankruptcy courts. See
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (lth Cir. 1981) (en banc); see
also Foster v. Jesup & Lamont Sec. Co., 759 F.2d 838, 843 & n.14 (lth Cir.
1985) (determining "the scope of § 12" by citing Bonner and applying Fifth Circuit
decisions as "controlling in this circuit").
86. The Third Circuit has held that in the absence of a "special relationship"
between the plaintiff and the defendant, section 12(2)'s "unambiguous language"
imposes liability on the "immediate seller" only. Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605
F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1979). The Seventh Circuit has stated in dictum that section
12(2) "explicitly requires privity between plaintiff-purchaser and defendant-seller."
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1226 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1005 (1981). Most Seventh Circuit district court decisions apply the Sanders
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most district courts have adopted it.17 Like Lennerth and the Fifth
Circuit, the other six circuits and the district courts pinpoint "par-
ticipation" as the basis of liability."8
Five of the other six circuits have adopted the participation theory
with discussion of two paragraphs or less. In each of two decisions,
the Second Circuit adopted the theory in one sentence. 9 The Fourth
Circuit's adoption came in two paragraphs that cited Hill York and
Lewis but did not otherwise interpret section 12's pertinent legislative
materials.9° The Eighth Circuit's adoption came in one sentence that
dictum. See, e.g., Yoshimura v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., No. 86 C 1461 (N.D.
Il1. Apr. 9, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (section 12(2)); Steinberg v.
Illinois Co., No. 85 C 7131 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file) (section 12(2)); Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,107, at 95,441 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1987) (section 12(2)); Riordan v.
Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., No. 84 C 3216 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 1986)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (section 12(2)); Beck v. Cantor, Fitzgerald &
Co., 621 F. Supp. 1547, 1561 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (section 12(2)); Kennedy v. Nicastro,
503 F. Supp. 1116, 1118 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (section 12(2)). But see, e.g., Ambling
v. Blackstone Cattle Co., No. 86 C 6485 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) (section 12(2) liability "extends to those participants who represent
the transferor by actively soliciting the sale of the transferor's securities"); Excalibur
Oil, Inc. v. Sullivan, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,938,
at 92,448-49 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 1985) (applying substantial-factor test to determine
section 12(2) liability).
87. See, e.g., Stone v. Fossil Oil & Gas, No. 84-1465-JB (D.N.M. Mar. 30,
1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) ("those who significantly participate in a
sale are liable under § 12 to the same extent as the person who actually passes
title"); Quincy Co-Operative Bank v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 655 F. Supp.
78, 84, 83 (D. Mass. 1986) ("brokers and others who have a substantial role in
a securities sale" are section 12(2) sellers, following circuits that impose liability
on "those whose participation in the sale was a 'substantial factor in causing the
transaction to take place' "); In re WICAT Sec. Litig., 600 F. Supp. 1236, 1239
(D. Utah 1984) (section 12(2) action imposing " 'participant liability' " under
substantial-factor test); Woods v. Homes & Structures, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1270,
1294 (D. Kan. 1980) (requiring "more than mere participation but . . . if the acts
of the defendant are a proximate cause of the sale . . . , the defendant meets the
seller requirement of Section 12"); In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Sec. Litig., 76
F.R.D. 337, 349 (N.D. Okla. 1975) ("significant participation in the sale of securities
may be sufficient for § 12(2) liability"). See also Seventh Circuit district court
decisions supra note 86.
88. See supra notes 85-87.
89. See Ackerman v. Oryx Communications, Inc., 810 F.2d 336, 344 (2d Cir.
1987); Mayer v. Oil Field Sys. Corp., 803 F.2d 749, 756 (2d Cir. 1986). The
sentences are quoted supra note 85. Ackerman and Mayer both cited Lanza v.
Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc), which did not cite a basis
for participant liability in section 12's pertinent legislative materials. See id. at
1298-99.
90. See Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (4th Cir. 1978). A subsequent
Fourth Circuit panel affirmed imposition of participant liability by citing Lawler
and stating that the earlier decision had "fully considered" the question of this
liability. See Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359, 363 (4th Cir. 1986).
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cited Fifth Circuit precedent but did not otherwise interpret these
materials. 91 In two decisions, the Ninth Circuit's adoption came in
one and two paragraphs respectively; 92 each decision cited Lennerth,
Hill York and Lewis but did not otherwise interpret the pertinent
legislative materials.
In Davis v. Avco Financial Services, Inc.93 the Sixth Circuit came
the closest to basing adoption of the participation theory on an
interpretation of section 12's pertinent legislative materials. After
quoting section 12 and definitions contained in section 2(3) of the
Act, the court acknowledged that "[i]f we are limited to a literal
reading of the statute, it is obvious that the plaintiffs here must
fail, because Avco was not in the literal sense the 'seller.' ,,94 The
panel held, however, that section 12(2) liability reaches participants
who meet the substantial-factor test. Without otherwise interpreting
section 12's-pertinent legislative materials, the panel based its holding
on conclusions concerning the securities acts' remedial purposes and
on "[t]he better reasoned cases," 95 including Lennerth and several
of the Fifth Circuit decisions. 96
In circuits in which the participation theory remains an open
question, most district courts adopt the theory by citing precedent
without otherwise interpreting section 12's pertinent legislative ma-
terials. In Cronin v. Executive House Realty,97 for example, the
91. See Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 1981) (citing Pharo v.
Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir. 1980)).
92. See Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982) (one
paragraph); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 649-50 (9th Cir. 1980) (two para-
graphs). Concerning the binding effect of Fifth Circuit precedent in the Eleventh
Circuit, see supra note 85.
93. 739 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 (1985).
94. Id. at 1064. Plaintiffs secured loans from the defendant finance company
to purchase shares in a pyramid scheme. The defendant company apparently was
unaware of the scheme when it made the initial loans. Then the scheme's promoters
contacted one of the company's managers about making further loans to potential
investors. The manager attended three meetings held by the promoters with such
investors. At the meetings, the manager provided blank loan application forms,
made a speech concerning financing, and represented to some plaintiffs that the
scheme was a "good quality investment." Id. at 1061. When the manager's superiors
learned of the scheme, they prohibited the making of any further loans. Id. at.
1062. The court of appeals found "abundant evidence" that the manager "allowed
himself to be duped by the . . . promoters into facilitating their dubious pyramidal
scheme." Id. The panel held that because the finance company was a substantial
factor in causing plaintiffs to purchase shares in the scheme, the company was a
"seller" from whom the plaintiffs had purchased these shares. Id.
95. Id. at 1064-65.
96. See id. at 1065-66.
97. [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,670 (S.D.N.Y. May
5, 1982); see also supra note 87. The participation theory remained an open question
in the Second Circuit until 1986. See supra notes 85, 89.
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court's analysis of participant liability consisted of two sentences:
A defendant need not be in privity with the plaintiff in order to
be liable as a seller under Section 12(2) .... Rather, one whose
participation in the transaction is a substantial factor in causing
the transaction may be primarily liable under Section 12(2)."
In decisions adopting section 12's participation theory since the early
1970's, citation and conclusions concerning remedial purpose thus
have displaced thorough statutory interpretation. Despite their ap-
parent proportions as a body of doctrine, the participation decisions
have not moved significantly beyond Lennerth's reasoning, which
was grounded in such conclusions otherwise unaccompanied by inter-
pretation of section 12's pertinent legislative materials. The partic-
ipation decisions create a marked contrast with the Supreme Court's
decisions interpreting securities provisions during this period. As the
next section shows, the Court's securities decisions are grounded in
close interpretation of the various sources of congressional intent.
The Court has refused to expand the scope of securities remedies
beyond the limits indicated by these sources, whether by invoking
remedial construction or by applying common law tort principles.
B. Securities Interpretation in the Supreme Court
1. Close Interpretation of Securities Provisions
In 1982, in Marine Bank v. Weaver,99 the Supreme Court held
that two instruments, a conventional certificate of deposit and a
business agreement between two families, were not securities within
the meaning of section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act.1c1 For the unanimous
Court, Chief Justice Burger wrote that "Congress, in enacting the
securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy
98. [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,670, at 93,364 (S.D.N.Y.
May 5, 1982) (citing Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 1980)).
99. 455 U.S. 551 (1982). For other discussions of the Supreme Court's recent
securities decisions, see, e.g., Conrad, Securities Regulation in the Burger Court,
56 U. CoLo. L. REV. 193 (1985); Cox, Ruminations on Statutory Interpretation in
the Burger Court, 19 VAL. U.L. Rv. 287 (1985); Freeman, A Study in Contrasts:
The Warren and Burger Courts' Approach to the Securities Laws, 83 DICK. L.
REV. 183 (1978); Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory
Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 892 (1982); see also O'Hara,
Erosion of the Privity Requirement in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933:
The Expanded Meaning of Seller, 31 UCLA L. REv. 921, 986-1001 (1984).
100. 455 U.S. at 560; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982) (defining "security").
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for all fraud."'' In another decision, the Court concluded that
Congress enacted "specified civil liabilities."'' 0 2 The mere circum-
stance of securities-related fraud, then, does not necessarily entitle
injured plaintiffs to federal securities relief.
Proceeding from this threshold determination that Congress did
not intend to federalize all securities fraud claims, the Court as-
certains the scope of a securities remedy by closely interpreting the
various sources of congressional intent. The Court begins by closely
interpreting the remedy's own language and legislative history. In
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder'013 in 1976, for example, the Court
declined to reach a result that the majority concluded would have
been inconsistent with these sources of intent. The Court held that
in a private damage action under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act' °4
101. 455 U.S. at 556. This statement was cited with approval in Landreth Timber
Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1985). See infra notes 191-232 and accompany-
ing text for discussion of Landreth and a companion decision. Congressional intent
not to occupy the field is indicated by sections 16 of the 1933 Act and 28(a) of
the 1934 Act, both of which provide that "[tihe rights and remedies provided by
this [Act] shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may
exist at law or in equity." 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb(a) (1982).
102. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); see also R. JENNINGS
& H. MARSH, SEcurRIs REGULATION 835-37 (6th ed. 1987).
103. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) [hereinafter section 10(b)]. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange ... (b) To use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
Neither section 10(b)'s language nor its legislative history indicates that in creating
a remedy in favor of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Congress in 1934
considered whether the section would support a private right of action. See, e.g.,
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 729-30 (1975); see also Note, Implied Liability Under the Securities Exchange
Act, 61 HARv. L. Rv. 858, 860 (1948). Nor is there any indication that the
Commission considered the prospect of private actions when it promulgated Rule
lOb-5 in 1942. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987); Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 3230, 13 Fed. Reg. 8177 (May 21, 1942); see also Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at
196; Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 730. On the Rule's promulgation and development,
see generally 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES
FRAUD §§ 2:27-2:47 (1967 & Supp. 1986) [hereinafter BROMBERG & LOWENFELS].
In 1946 a district court implied a private right of action under Rule l0b-5.
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Between
1946 and 1962, only 54 decisions were reported in private litigation under the Rule.
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and Rule lOb-5 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Corn-
See Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?,
57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627, 687-90 (1961) (citing decisions). By the late 1960's, however,
10 of the then 11 circuits had recognized an implied private right of action under
the Rule, and the number of reported decisions under the Rule's private right had
grown to well over 100 each year. See Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities
Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification
and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 598 n.l (1972) [hereinafter Ruder]; see
also 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3871-73 (Supp. 1969) [hereinafter Loss].
In 1969 the Supreme Court stated that "[section] 10(b) and Rule lob-5 may well
be the most litigated proyisions in the federal securities laws." SEC v. National
Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969). By that time, private plaintiffs were bringing
the bulk of the actions under the Rule. As a private remedy, the Rule had become,.
consistent with the Court's later description, "a judicial oak which has grown from
little more than a legislative acorn." Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 737.
In 1971 the Supreme Court unanimously stated in one sentence that an implied
private right of action exists under the Rule. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life
& Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) ("[i]t is now established that a private
right of action is implied under § 10(b)"). The statement came in a footnote, a
circumstance that invites recollection of Justice Frankfurter's tart observation that
"[a] footnote hardly seems to be an appropriate way of announcing a new con-
stitutional doctrine." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-91 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (discussing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938)). Footnotes, however, are also unusual sources for new statutory
determinations, particularly in circumstances such as those presented by the Court's
post-Bankers Life implied-right decisions.
The Bankers Life footnote stands in stark contrast both to the Court's penetrating
scrutiny of congressional intent in implied-right decisions since the mid-1970's, and
to the Court's rejection of implied-right claims in most of those decisions. See,
e.g., Schneider, Implying Private Rights and Remedies Under the Federal Securities
Acts, 62 N.C.L. REV. 853, 854 n.5, 863-96 (1984) (discussing decisions).
Despite rejection of most implied-right claims since the mid-1970's under a "stricter
standard for the implication of private causes of action," Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979), the Court has adhered to the Bankers Life
footnote's statement concerning Rule lOb-5. E.g., Herman & MacLean v. Hud-
dleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 & n.10 (1983) ("existence of this implied remedy is
simply beyond peradventure"); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689 (1980); Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 25 (1977); Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196; Blue
Chip, 421 U.S. at 730. The Court recently held that predispute agreements between
brokerage firms and their customers to arbitrate section 10(b) claims are enforceable
in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C §§ 1-208
(1982). See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
As it has reaffirmed the existence of a private right of action under Rule lOb-
5, the Court has restricted the reach of the Rule. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (tippees incur liability under Rule only if they have fiduciary
duty to corporation's shareholders not to trade on material nonpublic information;
this duty exists only when insider has breached fiduciary duty to shareholders by
disclosing information to tippee and tippee knows or should know about breach);
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 687-95 (1980) (Securities and Exchange Commission
must establish scienter as element of civil enforcement action to enjoin violation
of Rule); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (in action based on
nondisclosure, criminal liability under Rule "is premised upon a duty to disclose
arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction");
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mission (the Commission),"°" the plaintiff must allege that defendant's
conduct involved an element of scienter and not merely negligence.'° 6
Because " '[t]he starting point in every case involving construction
of a statute is the language itself,' ',107 Hochfelder first turned to the
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (Rule does not reach
breaches of fiduciary duty unaccompanied by manipulation or deception); Hoch-
felder, 425 U.S. at 193 & n.12 (private damage action under Rule requires allegation
of "scienter" -intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud); Blue Chip, 421 U.S.
at 730 (only actual purchaser or seller of securities may maintain private damage
action under Rule). But cf. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387
(1983) (availability of express remedy under section 11 of 1933 Act does not preclude
defrauded purchasers of registered securities from maintaining action under section
10(b); plaintiff must prove section 10(b) violation by preponderance of evidence).
According to Justice Blackmun, since the mid-1970's the Court has "pursue[d]
a course . . . designed to transform § 10(b) from an intentionally elastic 'catchall'
provision to one that catches relatively little of the misbehavior that all too often
makes investment in securities a needlessly risky business for the uninitiated investor."
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 246 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This course demonstrates
''a seeming callousness toward the investing public quite out of keeping . . . with
our own traditions and the intent of the securities laws," Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at
762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and "frustrates the congressional intent that the
securities laws be interpreted flexibly to protect investors." Dirks, 463 U.S. at 668
n.l (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
105. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987) [hereinafter Rule lob-5]. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
106. 425 U.S. at 193 & n.12. Hochfelder used the term "scienter" to refer to
"a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. The
Court has expressly left open the question whether reckless behavior is sufficient
for civil liability under the Rule. Id. at 194 n. 12; see also Aaron v. SEC, 446
U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980). The vast majority of lower courts addressing this question
have answered it in the affirmative. See T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECUIImES
REGULATION 459 & n.14 (1985 and Supp. 1987) (citing decisions) [hereinafter HAZEN].
107. 425 U.S. at 197 (quoting Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 756 (Powell, J., concurring));
see also Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 5 (1985) (construing section
14(e) of 1934 Act); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985)
(construing section 2(1) of 1933 Act and section 3(a)(10) of 1934 Act); Daily Income
Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 534 (1984) (construing section 36(b) of Investment
Company Act of 1940); Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 429 (1981) (construing
section 2(3) of 1933 Act); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 24 (1977)
(construing section 14(e) of 1934 Act).
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language of section 10(b). That "catchall"' 8 section makes unlawful,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, the use or
employment of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of" the Commission's rules under that section, in-
cluding Rule 10b-5.' 9
Hochfelder dissected the section's language phrase by phrase and
word by word. The phrase " 'manipulative or deceptive' used in
conjunction with 'device or contrivance,' " the Court began, "strongly
suggest[s] that [section] 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or
intentional misconduct.""'  The 1934 Act does not define the words
used in these phrases. The Court sought guidance in the definitions of
"manipulate,""' "device,""12 "contrivance,"" '  and "contrive""' 4
contained in Webster's New International Dictionary of the English
Language. The Court concluded that these words "make unmistak-
able a congressional intent to proscribe a type of conduct quite
different from negligence."" ' 5
Hochfelder rejected the Commission's contention as amicus that
because "the overall congressional purpose""' 6 of the 1933 and 1934
acts was to protect investors against injury from false and deceptive
practices, Congress "must have intended""' 7 that section 10(b) reach
negligent conduct. This contention, the Court concluded, "ignores
the use of the words""' in section 10(b) and "would add a gloss
to the operative language of the statute quite different from its
commonly accepted meaning.""19 This gloss would be impermissible
because "[a]scertainment of congressional intent with respect to the
108. A prominent spokesman for the 1934 Act's drafters described the provision
that would become section 10(b) as a "catch-all clause to prevent manipulative
devices." Hearings on H.R. 7852 & H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (statement of
Thomas G. Corcoran). The Supreme Court considers this description an apt char-
acterization of the section. See, e.g., Hcrman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 382 (1983) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980));
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 690 (1980) (quoting Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 203,
204, 206).
109. See supra note 105 for the text of Rule lob-5.
110. 425 U.S. at 197.
111. Id. at 199 n.21 (citing WEBSTER'S INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE (2d ed. 1934) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S]).
112. Id. at 199 n.20 (citing WEBSTER'S, supra note 111).
113. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S, supra note 111).
114. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S, supra note 111).
115. Id. at 199.
116. Id. at 198.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 199.
119. Id. at 198-99.
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standard of liability created by a particular section of the [1933 and
1934 acts] must ... rest primarily on the language of that sec-
tion." ' Finally, the Court interpreted section 10(b)'s legislative
history and the legislative scheme. 12' The Court found these sources
of congressional intent to be consistent with the result indicated by
the language of the section.
Close interpretation of statutory language and legislative history
remains central to the Court's decisions determining the meaning of
securities provisions."'2 In Aaron v. SEC' 3 in 1980, for example,
the Court declined both parties' requests' 4 to announce a uniform
culpability requirement for the three subsections of section 17(a) of
the 1933 Act.2 5 The Court determined that the section's language
was "simply not amenable to" the announcement the parties had
requested. 126
Aaron's interpretation of statutory language went further than
Hochfelder's had been required to go."' Whereas Hochfelder parsed
120. Id. at 200, quoted with approval in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 472 (1977).
121. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201-206.
122. See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 207-208 (1985) (in action interpreting
section 202(a)(1 1) of Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Court held that interpretation
advanced by Commission would "recast the statutory language" which the Court
"read literally"); Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 6-7, 13 & n.5 (1985)
(in action interpreting section 14(e) of 1934 Act, Court cited WEBSTER'S THUM
NEw INT'L DICTIONARY (1971) and held that plaintiff's reading of " 'manipulative' "
conflicted with "the normal meaning of the term," with "the use of the term
at common law, and with its traditional dictionary definition"); United States v.
Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 772-74 & n.5 (1979) (in action interpreting section 17(a)(1)
of 1933 Act, Court held that phrase found only in section 17(a)(3) may not be
read into all three subsections because "Congress did not write the statute that
way"); cf. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 97-100 & n.16 (1981) (citing WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976) in action interpreting standard of proof
required by section 7(c) of Administrative Procedure Act in Commission adjudicatory
proceedings).
123. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
124. See id. at 697.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982). See infra note 128 for the text of this section.
126. 446 U.S. at 697.
127. Hochfelder and Aaron are typical of securities decisions in which the Court
has rejected the Commission's proposed statutory interpretation as yielding a result
beyond the limits indicated by the various sources of congressional intent. See
Aaron, 446 U.S. at 691-95, 699-700, Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197-99, 206-14; see
also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 563-66 & n.20 (1979);
SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117-19 (1978); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430
U.S. 1, 29-35 (1977); Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 425-
27 (1972).
The Court recognizes that an administrative agency's "consistent and longstanding
interpretation" of the statute under which it operates, "while not controlling, is
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phrases and words within a single subsection, Aaron parsed three
paragraphs within a subsection and reached an independent result
concerning each one. Aaron held that in civil enforcement actions
alleging violation of section 17(a), 21 the Commission must establish
scienter under subsection 17(a)(1), but not under subsections 17(a)(2)
or 17(a)(3). When Aaron interpreted terms not defined in the 1933
Act, the Court again sought guidance from Webster's New Inter-
national Dictionary. 129
Aaron concluded that subsection 17(a)(1)-which makes it unlawful
for any person "to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud" 3°-0"plainly evinces an intent on the part of Congress to
proscribe only knowing or intentional misconduct.' ' 3' On the other
hand, subsection 17(a)(2)-which makes it unlawful for any person
to obtain money or property "by means of any untrue statement
of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact"-"is
entitled to considerable weight." United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers,
422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975) (citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965), and
adopting Commission's interpretation of section 22(d) of Investment Company Act
of 1940). As "the final authorities on issues of statutory construction," however,
courts adopt only administrative interpretations that have " 'reasonable basis in
law.' " Sloan, 436 U.S. at 118 (citing FTC v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 380 U.S.
374, 385 (1965), and NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944)).
Because courts have an "obligation to honor the clear meaning of a statute, as
revealed by its language, purpose, and history," Daniel, 439 U.S. at 566 n.20,
administrative interpretation must "provide ... a reasonable construction of the
statutory language and [be] consistent with legislative intent." Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 142 (1984); see also Clarke v. Securities
Indus. Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 750, 759-60 (1987) (citing Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp,
401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971)). On the limits of judicial deference to administrative
statutory interpretation, see 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.16
(2d ed. 1984).
128. Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or commun-
ication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or
indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of
a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
1933 Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982).
129. See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 696 n.13 (citing WEBSTER'S, supra note 111); see also
supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 128.
131. 446 U.S. at 696.
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devoid of any suggestion whatsoever of a scienter requirement."'1 2
Finally subsection 17(a)(3)-whiclmakes it unlawful for any person
"to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit"-"quite plainly
focuses upon the effect of particular conduct on members of the
investing public, rather than upon the culpability of the person
responsible."' 33 The Court then interpreted section 17's legislative
history and found no indication of congressional intent contrary. to
the intent indicated by the section's language." '
2. Negative Implication from the Legislative Scheme
and Regulatory Antecedents
a. The Legislative Scheme and Regulatory Antecedents
The Supreme Court's interpretation of a securities provision does
not necessarily end with close interpretation of the provision's own
language and legislative history. Even when congressional intent seems
clear or unambiguous, the Court generally interprets extrinsic sources
of that intent. Interpretation may proceed to other provisions in the
same act'35 or to provisions in one or more of the other securities
acts that comprise the federal legislative scheme. When a 1933 Act
provision is at issue, interpretation may also proceed to one or both
of two antecedent sources of securities regulation, the 1929 Uniform
Sale of Securities Act and the blue sky laws. 36
The federal legislative scheme consists of seven securities acts, 1
7
six of which were enacted during Franklin Roosevelt's administration,
and the seventh in 1970. The first two, the 1933 and 1934 acts, are
132. Id.
133. Id. at 697 (emphasis in original).
134. Id. at 697-700.
135. See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 692 (1985) (1934
Act); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571-74 (1979) (same); SEC
v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 112-14 (1978) (same); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1977) (same); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S.
282, 287-88 (1940) (1933 Act).
136. See, e.g., Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (interpreting
Uniform Act and blue sky laws); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 711 (1980) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[tihe problem of securities fraud
was by no means new in 1933, and many States had attempted to deal with it by
enactment of their own 'blue sky' statutes. When Congress turned to the problem,
it explicitly drew from their experience"); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S.
119, 123 (1953) (calling blue sky laws "the statutory antecedents of federal securities
legislation"); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (interpreting blue
sky laws); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 353-54 (1943) (same).
137. For a list of the federal securities acts, see supra note 14.
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statutes of general application, with the former primarily regulating
distribution of new securities issues and the latter primarily regulating
trading in previously distributed securities on national exchanges and
in the over-the-counter markets.'38 The remaining five acts comple-
ment the first two by imposing additional regulation on particular
persons or particular securities-related activity.13 9 The Uniform Act,
a model blue sky statute, was approved in 1929 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and by the
American Bar Association. 140 Blue sky laws, state legislation regu-
138. The 1933 and 1934 acts' spheres of regulation are not mutually exclusive.
Overlap is illustrated by United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979), which
affirmed the defendant's conviction under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act for fraud-
ulent trading activity. Id. at 772-79. Naftalin rejected the defendant's argument
that section 17(a) did not reach trading activity because "the [1933 Act] was
'preoccupied with' the regulation of initial public offerings of securities, and ...
Congress waited until the [1934 Act] to regulate abuses in the trading of securities
in the 'aftermarket.' " Id. at 777. The Court recognized that the 1933 Act was
"primarily concerned with the regulation of new offerings," but held that section
17(a) "was intended to cover any fraudulent scheme in an offer or sale of securities,
whether in the course of an initial distribution or in the course of ordinary market
trading." Id. at 777-78. The Court found it "neither unusual nor unfortunate"
that the 1933 and 1934 acts prohibit some of the same conduct. Id. (quoting SEC
v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969)).
139. The 1935 Act regulates holding companies that have subsidiaries that are
electric utility companies or companies engaged in retail distribution of natural or
manufactured gas. See 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(3)-(5) (1982). The 1939 Act regulates
distribution of notes, bonds, debentures, and other evidences of indebtedness,
whether or not secured, and certificates representing these interests. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77ddd(a)(1) (1982). The Investment Company Act of 1940 regulates issuers engaged
primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding or trading in
securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1982). The Investment Advisers Act of 1940
regulates persons engaged for compensation in the business of advising others
concerning the value of securities or the advisability of investing in, purchasing or
selling securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1982). The 1970 Act created the
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a federally chartered nonprofit
membership corporation that insures the accounts of customers of brokers and
dealers and members of national securities exchanges. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc (1982).
140. See Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and Proceedings 171, 172, 173 (1929) [hereinafter Handbook]. For
discussion of the events that culminated in the Uniform Act's approval, see M.
PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 21-28 (1970) [hereinafter
PARRISH]. By creating the need to coordinate state securities registration with federal
registration requirements, the 1933 Act left the Uniform Act materially deficient.
Largely because of this deficiency, no state adopted the Uniform Act after 1933.
In 1944, the National Conference withdrew the Uniform Act from its list of
recommended acts. See Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings 233 (1944). In 1956, the Commissioners
and the American Bar Association approved the Uniform Securities Act, another
model blue sky statute. UNIF. SEC. ACT, 7B U.L.A. 510 (1985) (historical note).
The 1956 Act, as amended in 1958, has been superseded by the Uniform Securities
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lating securities transactions, date from Kansas' comprehensive 1911
statute; 4' by early 1933, forty-seven of the then forty-eight states,
plus the territory of Hawaii, had enacted blue sky laws. 142
The Court construes provisions within a securities act together
because in the absence of contrary intent, the legislature is presumed
to intend that a statute be interpreted as a unified whole. 143 Ever
since John Marshall's tenure as Chief Justice, the Court has also
adhered to the principle that statutes in pari materia-having the
same purpose or object-may be "construed together as forming
one act" when circumstances fairly demonstrate that Congress leg-
islated with knowledge of the prior related statutes.'" Consistent
with this principle, the Court in 1969 confirmed that " 'the inter-
dependence of the various sections of the securities laws is certainly
a relevant factor in any interpretation of the language Congress has
chosen.' ,,145 In its interpretation of the federal legislative scheme,
Act (1985), which the Commissioners approved in 1985. See id. at 30 (Supp. 1987)
(historical note).
141. See 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 210. On blue sky laws generally, see L. Loss &
E. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW (1958). The precise origin of the laws' nickname
remains uncertain, but the nickname's widespread use dates from a 1917 Supreme
.Court decision that described the laws as directed against "speculative schemes
which have no more basis than so many feet of 'blue sky.' " Hall v. Geiger-Jones
Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917).
142. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933). Blue sky laws now exist
in every state and in the District of Columbia, Guam and Puerto Rico. The federal
securities acts expressly permit concurrent blue sky regulation. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r,
78bb(a), 79(u), 77zzz, 80a-49, 80b-18a (1982).
143. 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 46.05,
46.06, 47.01 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1984) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND]; see, e.g., Panama
Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 439 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) ("meaning
of a statute is to be looked for, not in any single section, but in all the parts
together and in their relation to the end in view"); cf INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
107 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (1987) ("[w]here Congress includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion").
144. Alexander v. Mayor of Alexandria, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 1, 7 (1809); see also
Doe v. Winn, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 380, 386 (1826); United States v. Fisher, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 390-91 (1805). See generally 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 143,
§§ 51.01-51.08.
145. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969), quoted with approval
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976). Even before National
Securities, the Court had construed the securities acts as in pari materia. In
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), for example, the Court stated:
This case presents the Court with its first opportunity to construe [the
definition of 'security' in section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act]. But we do
not start with a blank slate. The Securities Act of 1933 . . . contains a
definition of security virtually identical to that contained in the 1934
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the Court does not restrict analysis to securities acts enacted before
the provision being interpreted; 146 the Court also analyzes subse-
quently enacted securities acts.147 The Court assigns extrinsic securities
Act. Consequently, we are aided in our task by our prior decisions which
have considered the meaning of security under the 1933 Act.
Id. at 335-36 (footnotes and citation omitted); see also Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (quoting Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 206) (1933
and 1934 Acts "constitute interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme
governing transactions in securities"); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 471 (1977) (1933 and 1934 acts are "related"); Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 & n. 15 (1972) (six Roosevelt administration securities
statutes are "companion legislative enactments"); SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) ("Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was
the last in a series of Acts designed to eliminate certain abuses in the securities
industry"), quoted with approval in Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 190 (1985).
146. For decisions analyzing securities acts enacted before the provision being
interpreted, see, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 690-91 (1980) (in action
interpreting section 10(b) of 1934 Act, Court analyzed "structure of the civil liability
provisions in the 1933 and 1934 Acts"); id. at 713 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority for "failure to appreciate the structural interrelationship among
equitable remedies in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, and to accord that interrelationship
proper weight"); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20-
21 & n.10 (1979) (in action interpreting sections 206 and 215 of Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, Court analyzed "each of the securities laws that preceded" that Act);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206-11 (1976) (in action interpreting
section 10(b), Court analyzed 1933 Act provisions); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 & n.4, 733-36, 753 (1975) (same); id. at 755-56
(Powell, J., concurring) (same); Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 335-36, quoted supra note
145 (same).
147. See, e.g., SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 741 & n.8, 7.37-
44 & n. 13 (1984) (in action interpreting 1933 and 1934 act provisions, Court analyzed
"language and structure of the statutes administered by the Commission," including
the four later Roosevelt administration securities statutes); Rubin v. United States,
449 U.S. 424, 432 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing 1934 Act provision in
interpretation of 1933 Act provision); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 151 & n.15 (1972) (in action interpreting section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5,
Court analyzed three of the four later Roosevelt administration securities statutes).
Similarly, examination of subsequently enacted securities acts was central to the
Court's determination that commercial paper is a "security" under the Banking
Act of 1933, commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act. See Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 143, 150-54, 164, 171-72 (1984); see
also Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.). Among other things, Glass-Steagall prohibits commercial
banks from underwriting "securities or stock" and from marketing "stocks, bonds,
debentures, notes or other securities." 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh) 335, 378(a)(1)
(1982). Glass-Steagall, however, does not define the term "security." Because
"Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall Act as one of several pieces of legislation
collectively designed to restore public confidence in financial markets," 468 U.S.
at 150, the Court analyzed the term's definitions in related legislation-not only
the 1933 Act (passed two weeks before Glass-Steagall), but also the 1934 and 1935
acts. Id. at 150-52. On remand the court of appeals also examined the two subsequent
statutes. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 807 F.2d 1052, 1062-65
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
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legislation, like other extrinsic sources of congressional intent, the
weight that appears warranted under the circumstances.
The realities of the legislative process weaken any assumption that
whenever Congress enacts a statute, the lawmakers perforce know
of all related federal statutes. Weaker yet is any assumption that
the lawmakers know of all related uniform acts and state legislation.
Proper application of the in pari materia principle, then, depends
on an affirmative demonstration of congressional knowledge. The
principle has particular force when, like the 1933 and 1934 acts,
the assertedly related statutes were enacted by the same Congress 48
and the later statute refers to the earlier one. 149 The principle is also
potent when, like the remaining five federal securities statutes, en-
actment was accomplished by different Congresses whose lawmakers
referred to the earlier statutes throughout the debate50 and in the
statute itself.' The Uniform Act and the blue sky laws remain
instructive in 1933 Act interpretation because the initial federal act's
drafters and enactors examined these regulatory antecedents and were
influenced by the strengths and weaknesses they perceived. 15 2
The historical record justifies Professor Loss' conclusion that the
1933 and 1934 acts are "as closely related as two nominally separate
statutes could be.' 1 3 After an early fruitless effort to draft a se-
148. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940); see also 2A
SUTHERLAND, supra note 143, §§ 51.03, 51.01, 51.02. The 1933 and 1934 acts were
enacted by the 73d Congress. See 1934 Act, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934); 1933 Act,
ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
149. The 1934 Act referred to the 1933 Act and amended the earlier Act in
significant respects. 1934 Act, ch. 404, §§ 201-210, 48 Stat. 905-909 (1934).
150. See infra note 161.
151. See infra note 162.
152. See, e.g., F. FRIEDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: LAUNCHING THE NEW DEAL
340-50 (1973); 1 Loss, supra note 104, at 128; PARRISH, supra note 140, at 48;
A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 440-42 (1958) [hereinafter
SCHLESINGER]; J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 53 (1982) [here-
inafter SELIGMAN]; Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933,
28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 29, 31-33, 37 (1959); see also H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 10-11 (1933); 77 CoNG. REc. 937 (1933) (message from President); id. at
2912 (remarks of Rep. Mapes); id. at 2314 (remarks of Rep. Greenwood); id. at
2930 (remarks of Rep. Wolverton); id. at 2939 (remarks of Rep. Kopplemann); id.
at 2947 (remarks of Rep. Mott). The English Companies Act, which did not impose
participant liability, also influenced the 1933 Act's drafters and enactors. See 1 Loss,
supra note 104, at 128.
153. 6 Loss, supra note 104, at 3195 (Supp. 1969). For Supreme Court decisions
that have construed the 1933 and 1934 acts as in pari materia, see supra notes
145-47. Lower courts have also construed the two acts in this way. See, e.g., Berger
v. Bishop Inv. Corp., 695 F.2d 302, 307-308 (8th Cir. 1982); Lincoln Nat'l Bank
v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1979); Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoller
& Danneberg Exploration, Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059, 1066 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 965 (1977); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1298 n.65 (2d Cir.
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curities bill that would have regulated both distribution and trading,
President Roosevelt settled on separate bills that together served as
the foundation of a unified regulatory program.'5 4 The President
stressed this unity in both of his messages to Congress recommending
enactment of the acts.'55 Lawmakers in 1933 knew that the securities
bill primarily regulating distribution would be followed swiftly by one
primarily regulating trading;" 6 in turn, lawmakers in 1934 knew
of the close relationship of that year's securities bill to the nascent
1933 Act. 7 Indeed, the 1934 Act amended the 1933 Act in significant
respects.5 8 Finally, as enacted and as amended during the last half-
1973) (en banc); SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 81-82
(2d Cir. 1970); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1286 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp.
621, 691-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (1933 and 1934 acts "are to be read together as one
comprehensive scheme of regulation ... [A] contrary view flies in the face of
common sense and the objectives of the Congress in formulating and drafting this
legislation"); Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (E.D. Pa.
1948).
154. See PARRISH, supra note 140, at 42-47; SCHLESINGER, supra note 152, at
440-41; SELIGMAN, supra note 152, at 50-53.
155. In his March 29, 1933, message recommending enactment of the 1933 Act,
the President stated:
This is but one step in our broad purpose of protecting investors and
depositors. It should be followed by legislation relating to the better
supervision of the purchase and sale of all property dealt in on exchanges,
and by legislation to correct unethical and unsafe practices on the part
of officers and directors of banks and other corporations.
H.R. Doc. No. 12, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 77 CONG. Rac. 937
(1933). The President called attention to these words the following year in his
message recommending enactment of the 1934 Act. See 78 CONG. REc. 2264 (1934).
156. See, e.g., 77 CONG. REc. 1021 (1933) (remarks of Sen. King) ("Committee
on Banking and Currency for some time has been considering important questions
dealing with . . . stock exchanges, the sale of securities, investment trusts, and
relevant and pertinent matters"); id. at 3223 (remarks of Sen. Norbeck) ("pending
bill does not in any way deal with the stock exchange. That matter has been left
for subsequent and much-needed legislation").
157. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 2270 (1934) (statement of Sen. Fletcher) ("bill
just introduced for the regulation of securities exchanges is one of the series of
steps taken and to be taken for the purpose of bringing safety to the general public
in the field of investment and finance"); id. at 7939 (remarks of Rep. Milligan)
(calling 1934 bill "a companion bill of the Securities Act"); id. at 7959 (remarks
of Rep. Dirksen) (same); id. at 8107 (remarks of Rep. Cox) (discussing "very close
and intimate relationship between the Securities Act and this stock-exchange bill");
id. (remarks of Sen. Barkley) (1933 and 1934 acts are "inseparably related"); id.
at 2270 (remarks of Sen. Fletcher) (1933 and 1934 acts are "intimately related").
158. See 1934 Act, ch. 404, §§ 201-210, 48 Stat. 905-909 (1934). The 1934 Act
also created the Commission to administer both acts. Id. §§ 4, 210, 48 Stat. 885,
908-909 (1934). The Federal Trade Commission had previously administered the 1933
Act. See 1933 Act, ch. 38, § 2(5), 48 Stat. 75 (1933).
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century, the 1934 Act refers to 1933 Act provisions and thus helps
cement the intimate relationship between the two statutes. 5 9
The remaining five securities acts are closely related to the first
two and to one another. In his 1933 and 1934 messages to Congress,
President Roosevelt anticipated the proposal of subsequent securities
legislation. 160 In the debate preceding the enactment of the four
subsequent Roosevelt administration securities acts and of the 1970
Act, lawmakers referred to the previous acts and supporters stated
that new legislation was necessary to fill existing gaps in federal
securities regulation. 61 In filling the perceived gap in each instance,
159. See, e.g., 1934 Act § 13(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(6) (1982) (obligation to
file and send section 13(d)(1) statement does not apply to "any acquisition or offer
to acquire securities made or proposed to be made" by 1933 Act registration
statement); id. § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1982) (issuer that files 1933 Act
registration statement must file such supplementary and periodic information, doc-
uments and reports as Commission may require under 1934 Act § 13); id. § 19(h)(2),
(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(2), (3) (1982) (regulatory agency for self-regulatory organ-
ization authorized to discipline any member or participant who willfully'violates,
or effects any transaction for person it had reason to believe was violating, 1933
Act provision); id. § 21(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g) (1982) (defining "securities laws"
to include 1933 Act).
For most of the last half-century, 1933 Act and 1934 Act disclosure requirements
proceeded along different paths and compliance with one act's requirements did
not constitute compliance with the other's. After several years of study, the Com-
mission recently adopted an integrated disclosure system designed to streamline and
coordinate the acts' respective requirements. See generally HAZEN, supra note 106,
at 61-64; R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 110-20 (6th ed. 1987).
160. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
161. For comments on the 1935 Act, see, e.g., 79 CONG. REc. 8393 (1935)
(remarks of Sen. Wheeler) ("Commission itself feels that the [1933 Act] is not
designed to deal with" abuses by public utility holding companies); id. at 8618
(remarks of Sen. Dieterich) ("more than half of this bill is covered by the Securities
Exchange Act" and thus would impose "a dual regulation"); id. at 8632 (remarks
of Sen. Barkley) ("[njeither [the 1933 Act nor the 1934 Act] covers the situation
which is intended to be covered by this measure"); id. at 8777 (remarks of Sen.
Dickinson) ("[w]hy is it necessary to duplicate [the 1933 Act]?"); id. at 10,356
(remarks of Rep. Mapes) ("great many of the abuses .. .by public-utility holding
companies ... have already been corrected ... by the ... Securities and the
Stock Exchange Acts").
For comments on the 1939 Act, see, e.g., 84 CONG. REC. 3108 (1939) (remarks of
Rep. Cole) ("[iun general, the bill will apply only to indentures which are now
required to be filed and examined under the Securities Act of 1933"); id. at 5004
(remarks of Sen. Barkley) ("persistence of ... defects ... is not enough"); id.
at 5013 (remarks of Sen. Taft) ("existing S.E.C. Act is based on the theory of
full disclosure .... But this measure ... provides what shall be in ... trust
indentures"); id. at 9513 (remarks of Rep. Mapes) (1939 bill "is a sort of supplement
to" the 1933 and 1934 acts); id. at 9530 (remarks of Rep. Rayburn) (discussing
the three previous securities acts).
For comments on the 1940 acts, see, e.g., 86 CONG. REC. 2844 (1940) (remarks
of Sen. Wagner) (noting that 1940 bills resulted from Commission's study under
1987]
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lawmakers expressly wrote the close relationship into the legislation. 162
b. Negative Implication
Since the early 1970's, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
securities acts' legislative scheme has frequently produced negative
1935 Act's authority and direction); id. at 9815 (remarks of Rep. Sabath) ("[iun
conjunction with the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1935, . . . this closes another
door on the financial crooks"); id. at 9816 (remarks of Rep. Wolverton) (1933
and 1934 acts "have not been effectual in preventing the type of abuses that have
grown up in the investment field").
Concerning the 1970 Act, one Senator observed:
[The 1933 and 1934 acts] are largely successful in accomplishing their
purposes. But ... there still exists a serious gap in our securities laws
which neither of these statutes covers. An investor may exercise sound
judgment in his choice of stock, and he may place his order with a
reputable broker. Nevertheless, he may still lose his entire investment if
the broker subsequently fails because of operational or financial difficulty.
116 CONG. REc. 40,867-68 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
162. See, e.g., 1970 Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78bbb (1982) (discussing application
of 1934 Act); id. § 78ccc(a) (creating Securities Investor Protection Corp., whose
members shall be all persons registered as brokers or dealers under § 15(b) of 1934
Act); id. § 78kkk(f) (discussing inapplicability of § 20(a) of 1934 Act); id. § 78111(14)
(discussing 1933 Act registration statement); Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
§ 202, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(21) (1982) (defining 1933, 1934, 1935 and 1939 acts);
id. § 80b-3(e) (authorizing Commission to discipline investment advisers who willfully
commit primary or secondary violations of 1933 or 1934 acts or Investment Company
Act of 1940); id. § 80b-8(b) (permitting statement that person is registered under
1934 Act); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 2(a)(26), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(26)
(1982) (referring to exchanges registered under 1934 Act); id. § 80a-2(a)(31) (referring
to 1933 Act definition of "prospectus"); id. § 80a-2(44) (defining 1933, 1934, 1935,
and 1939 acts); id. §§ 80a-3(c)(8), (11) (exempting companies subject to 1935 Act
regulation and certain trusts exempt from 1933 Act regulation); id. § 80a-8 (requiring
registered investment companies to file 1933 and 1934 act information and doc-
uments); id. § 80a-14 (referring to 1933 Act regulation of investment company
offerings); id. § 80a-24 (referring to registration of registered investment company's
securities under 1933 Act); id. § 80a-34(c) (permitting statement that person or
security is registered under 1933 or 1934 acts); id. § 80a-37(b) (permitting Commission
to authorize filing of information or documents required by 1933, 1934, 1935 or
1939 acts); id. § 80a-49 (Act does not affect Commission's jurisdiction or any
person's rights and obligations under 1933, 1934, 1935 or 1939 acts); 1939 Act
§ 303(1)-(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77ccc(1)-(3) (1982) (defining terms by reference to 1933 Act
definitions); id. § 77ccc(17) (defining 1933, 1934 and 1935 acts); id. § 77ddd(a)-
(b) (exempting securities exempted from certain 1933 Act provisions); id. § 77fff
(prohibitions affecting securities not registered under 1933 Act); id. § 77hhh (au-
thorizing Commission, by rule, regulation, or order, to integrate 1939 Act filings
with 1933, 1934 or 1935 act filings); id. § 77vvv (judicial review of offenses and
suits as provided in 1933 Act); id. § 77www(b) (Act's rights and remedies supplement
those existing under 1933, 1934 or 1935 acts); id. § 77zzz (Act does not affect
Commission's jurisdiction or person's rights and obligations under 1933, 1934 and
1935 acts); 1935 Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 79p(b) (1982) (Act's rights and remedies
supplement those existing under 1933 and 1934 acts); id. § 79u (Act does not affect
Commission's jurisdiction under 1933 or 1934 acts).
[Vol. XV
19871 SECTION 12 LIABILITY
implication. Where a statutory provision contains a particular des-
ignation, negative implication permits an inference that omissions
should be understood as exclusions. More than forty years ago in
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp. ,163 the Court stressed that negative
implication is an "aid to construction" 1 whose force depends largely
on contextual support.1 65 Persons, including legislators, may say A
without necessarily intending to exclude B or C,166 and indeed without
necessarily even acknowledging the existence of B or C. Negative
implication holds particular force, however, when matter omitted
from the provision in question appears in another provision in the
same statute or in one or more statutes that circumstances fairly
demonstrate may be construed as in pari materia.167
The Court has drawn negative inferences from other sections of
a securities provision's own statute.' 6 Negative inference is partic-
ularly compelling when, as in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,'69
the sections are contiguous to the provision at issue. Touche Ross
held that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action
under section 17(a) of the 1934 Act, 7' which requires broker-dealers
163. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
164. Id. at 351 n.8.
165. The Court stated:
[Clourts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dom-
inating general purpose, will read text in the light of context and will
interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly permits so
as to carry out in particular cases the generally expressed legislative
policy.
Id. at 350-51 (footnote omitted), cited with approval in SEC v. National Sec.,
Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969).
166. See, e.g., Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1930). The
author stated:
The rule that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another
is in direct contradiction to the habits of speech of most persons. To
say that all men are mortal does not mean that all women are not, or
that all other animals are not. There is no such implication, either in
usage or in logic, unless there is a very particular emphasis on the word
men .... The question will accordingly be in every case, not whether
or not the expression of one thing excludes everything else, but whether
we are to deny or affirm this rule in this particular case. We shall
evidently deny it or affirm it for some other reason than its axiomatic
force, and it will be necessary to search for that other reason.
Id. at 873-74 (emphasis in original).
167. See 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 143, §§ 47.23, 51.01; see also R. DICKERSON,
THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 47 (1975).
168. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-
20 (1979) (Investment Advisers Act of 1940); Securities Investor Protection Corp.
v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 419 (1975) (1970 Act).
169. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
170. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1982).
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to keep such records and file such reports as the Commission may
prescribe. The Court stressed that section 17(a) is "flanked"'' by
sections 16(b) and 18(a),' 72 each of which expressly creates a private
right of action. "Obviously . . . " the Court concluded, "when Con-
gress wished to provide a private damages remedy, it knew how to
do so . .. ."I"
Hochfelder174 and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 75 drew
negative inferences from statutes in pari materia. After interpreting
the language and legislative history of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,
Hochfelder turned to the 1933 Act for confirmation that Congress
intended the section to reach only conduct involving an element of
scienter.' 76 After stating that "[t]he 1933 and 1934 [a]cts constitute
interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme governing
transactions in securities,"' 77 the Court first concluded that section
11 of the 1933 Act, 171 whose due diligence defenses in effect create
a negligence standard, "stands in sharp contrast to the language of
section 10(b)."' 79 The Court went on to analyze each express 1933 Act
civil remedy that allows recovery for negligent conduct;8 0 the Court
noted that each is subject to "significant procedural restrictions"
not found in section 10(b).'8 ' To permit private section 10(b) damage
actions based on allegations of only negligence, the majority rea-
soned, would nullify these restrictions by permitting 1933 Act neg-
ligence claims to be brought under that section. 18 2
When Blue Chip held that under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
private damage actions may be maintained only by actual purchasers
or sellers of securities, 8 3 the Court emphasized the contrast between
[section] 10(b). '" ' The Court went on to analyze each express 1933 Act
civil remedy that allows recovery for negligent conduct;'80 the Court
171. 442 U.S. at 571-72.
172. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(b), 78r(a) (1982).
173. 442 U.S. at 572, quoted in Lewis, 444 U.S. at 21.
174. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See supra notes 103-21 and accompanying text for
discussion of Hochfelder.
175. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See infra notes 193-203, 233-39 and accompanying
text for discussion of Blue Chip.
176. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195.
177. Id. at 206. For discussion of the 1933 and 1934 acts' close relationship,
see supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
178. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982).
179. 425 U.S. at 208; see 1933 Act § 11(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1982) (due
diligence defenses).
180. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 208-10.
181. Id. at 209-11 (discussing restrictions).
182. Id. at 210.
183. 421 U.S. at 723.
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in section 17(a)-which proscribes fraud "in the offer or sale of
securities." 8  "When Congress wished to provide a remedy to those
who neither purchase nor sell securities," the Court concluded, in
language that Touche Ross would later paraphrase, "it had little
trouble in doing so expressly." '
In its interpretation of a 1933 Act provision in Rubin v. United
States,116 the Court demonstrated a willingness to draw negative
inferences from the Uniform Act and the pre-1933 blue sky laws.
Rubin held that a pledge of stock to a bank as collateral for a loan
constitutes an offer or sale of a security under section 17(a) of the
1933 Act. 8 7 The Court noted that "[tihe Uniform Sale of Securities
Act ... defined 'sale' in language almost identical to that now
appearing in [section] 2(3)" of the 1933 Act.' 8 8 Pledges had been in-
cluded in the Uniform Act's definition by pre-1933 decisions under blue
sky laws that had adopted that definition. 18 9 The Court found "noth-
ing to suggest that Congress did not intend the broad scope that
cases arising under the Uniform Act ... had given the definition
of 'sale.' "190
3. Policy Considerations
a. The Landreth Footnote
In a 1985 footnote in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,1 9' the
Supreme Court stated that "it is proper for a court to consider-
184. Id. at 733-34. For the full texts of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, see supra
notes 104-105. For the full text of section 17(a), see supra note 128.
185. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 734, paraphrased in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979). The Court's decision in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
459 U.S. 375 (1983), comports with Touche Ross, Hochfelder and Blue Chip.
Huddleston held that the express cause of action provided by section 11 of the
1933 Act does not bar purchasers of registered securities from suing under section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5. After concluding that sections 11 and 10(b) "involve distinct
causes of action and were intended to address different types of wrongdoing," id.
at 381, the Court determined that the legislative scheme did not support an inference
that the plaintiff's use of section 11's express remedy bars the plaintiff's use of
section 10(b)'s implied remedy. Id. at 387 & n.23. In particular, the Court noted
that sections 16 of the 1933 Act and 28(a) of the 1934 Act provide that "[tlhe
rights and remedies provided by this [Act] shall be in addition to any and all other
rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity." Id. at 383 (citing 15
U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb(a) (1982)).
186. 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
187. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982), quoted in full supra note 128.
188. 449 U.S. at 430.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
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as we do today-policy considerations in construing terms in [the
federal securities acts]." '92 The Court had laid the footnote's foun-
dation throughout the previous decade.
The Landreth footnote cited Blue Chip, which held that only
actual purchasers or sellers of securities may maintain private damage
actions under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 93 To ascertain the
meaning of section 10(b)'s critical terms, the Blue Chip Court in-
terpreted the section's language and legislative history and the leg-
islative scheme.'9 Blue Chip then determined that it was "proper"' 9
to "consider ... what may be described as policy considerations"' 96
to "flesh out' 1 97 the terms' meaning, which the Court concluded
these sources of congressional intent indicated'98 but did not con-
clusively establish.' 99 Blue Chip's consideration of securities policy
consumed thirteen pages200 despite the dissenters' warning that policy
consideration was imprudent.2 0' With some prescience in light of
Landreth and its companion decision, 20 2 the dissent warned that the
majority's approach might support policy consideration in future
decisions interpreting securities provisions .203
Hochfelder 204 and Aaron0 5 are consistent with Blue Chip's approval
of policy consideration in the unusual circumstance in which a court
concludes that the various sources of congressional intent are not
192. Id. at 694-95 n.7.
193. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text for
discussion of Blue Chip.
194. 421 U.S. at 727-30, 733-36.
195. Id. at 737.
196. Id.; see also id. at 749 (discussing "considerations of policy").
197. Id. at 737.
198. Id. at 733.
199. Id. at 737.
200. See id. at 737-49.
201. See id. at 771 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas and Brennan,
JJ.).
202. See Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985).
203. Justice Blackmun explained:
I am uneasy about the type of precedent the present decision establishes.
Policy considerations can be applied and utilized in like fashion in other
situations. The acceptance of this decisional route in this case may well
come back to haunt us elsewhere before long. I would decide the case
to fulfill the broad purpose that the language of the statutes and the
legislative history dictate ....
421 U.S. at 771 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas and Brennan, JJ.).
204. For discussion of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), see
supra notes 102-21, 174-82 and accompanying text.
205. For discussion of Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), see supra notes 123-
34 and accompanying text.
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dispositive of a securities term's meaning. Aaron, for example, held
that in civil enforcement actions alleging violation of section 17(a)
of the 1933 Act, the Commission must establish scienter under
subsection 17(a)(1) but not under subsections 17(a)(2) or 17(a)(3). 206
The Court announced this holding after interpreting the section's
language and legislative history. 20 7 In its last footnote, the Court
foreclosed policy consideration by distinguishing Blue Chip: "Since
the language and legislative history of [section] 17(a) are dispositive, we
have no occasion to address the 'policy' arguments advanced by the
parties." 2 8
Neither the Landreth footnote's broad language nor the reasoning
of Landreth and its companion decision restricts policy consideration
to Blue Chip's unusual circumstance. Landreth acknowledged that
the Court's precedents extending back more than four decades had
"not been entirely clear on the proper method of analysis for
determining" the meaning of "security, ' ' 20 9 the term at issue in that
decision and the companion. The Court also noted that the circuits
were divided concerning the term's meaning in the situation at issue
in the two decisions. 210 The Court, however, announced its holdings
after interpreting statutory language, legislative history and the leg-
islative scheme. 21
Unlike Hochfelder and Aaron, Landreth and its companion did
not stop here. Instead the eight-Justice majorities proceeded to discuss
reasons why the holdings comported with "sound policy. ' 21 2 The
discussions provide support for Justice Stevens' assertion in dissent
that, as Landreth's broad footnote stated was "proper," the Court
had based its construction of the critical term partly "on its own
evaluation of the relevant 'policy considerations.' ",213 As the Court
had intimated in Blue Chip, policy considerations might be influential
when a court, after interpreting the various sources of congressional
206. See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 680, 695-96.
207. Id. at 700.
208. Id. at 700 n.19; see also Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214 n.33.
209. 471 U.S. at 688.
210. See id. at 685. Landreth and its companion concerned the sale-of-business
doctrine. See infra notes 221-32 and accompanying text for discussion of this
doctrine. The Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh circuits had applied the doctrine
to the sale of all or part of a business' stock; the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth
and Eighth circuits had rejected the doctrine. See Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737
F.2d 320, 321 n.3 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing cases), aff'd sub nom. Gould v. Ruefenacht,
471 U.S. 701 (1985).
211. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 685-94; Gould, 471 U.S. at 704.
212. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 694-97; Gould, 471 U.S. at 704-706.
213. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 700 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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intent, must choose between competing constructions that each appear
within the limits indicated by these sources. 21 4
To be distinguished from policy is legislative purpose. To aid in
the ascertainment and application of legislative intent, courts fre-
quently consider the legislature's broad purposes for enacting the
provision or statute at issue. 2 5 Each federal securities act contains
an express statement of purpose, necessity for regulation, or find-
ings. 21 6 Landreth itself is typical of securities decisions in which the
Court has sought congressional purpose in these and other sources
7
.
21
The Landreth footnote, however, approves consideration of more
than Congress' purposes for enacting a securities provision or statute.
In Landreth and its companion decision, all nine Justices expressly
approved consideration of securities policy2l8-consideration of the
214. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 731-41.
215. See, e.g., A. LENHOFF, COMMENTS, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON LEG-
ISLATION 630 (1949) ("purpose of a statute is certainly an excellent guide for the
discovery of the legislative intent"); Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts,
25 IOWA L. REV. 737, 756-64 (1940); see also Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 771 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (quoted supra note 203).
216. See 1970 Act, Pub. L. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636, 1636 (1933) (statement of
purpose); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 201, 54 Stat. 789, 847 (1940)
(findings); Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789, 789 (1940)
(statement of purpose); id. § 1, 54 Stat. 789, 789-90 (findings and declaration of
policy); 1939 Act, ch. 411, § 302, 53 Stat. 1149, 1150-51 (1939) (necessity for
regulation); 1935 Act, ch. 687, § 1, 49 Stat. 803, 803-804 (1935) (same); 1934 Act,
ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 881 (1934) (statement of purpose); id. § 2, 48 Stat. 881,
881-82 (necessity for regulation); 1933 Act, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, 74 (statement of
purpose).
217. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 687-88; see, e.g., Schreiber v. Burlington N.,
Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1985); Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 539-
41 (1984); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983); United
States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 774-77 (1979); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1, 25-37 (1977); Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195; Foremost-McKesson, Inc.
v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 243-50 (1976); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 431-33 (1964); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180, 186-95 (1963); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 & n.10 (1953);
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943).
218. See Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 695 n.7 (majority of eight) ("proper for a
court to consider-as we do today-policy considerations in construing terms in
[the federal securities] Acts"); id. at 700 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("policy
considerations are relevant in construing the Securities Acts"). Approval represented
some change of sentiment for Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Stevens. Justice
Brennan had joined Justice Blackmun's Blue Chip dissent, which expressed misgivings
about the prudence of policy consideration. See supra note 203 and accompanying
text. In Santa Fe Indus., Inc., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), Justice Stevens
concluded that Blue Chip had been wrongly decided "[fior the reasons stated by
Mr. Justice Blackmun in his dissenting opinion" in that earlier decision. Id. at
480-81 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
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result that a congress should favor, without express reference to
Congress' purposes for enacting the provision or statute. As Blue
Chip had done a decade earlier, the Court first interpreted the
various sources of congressional intent. 219 The Court then discussed
securities policy without relating that discussion to "the language
of the statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations
of purpose." 220
b. Securities Policy
Landreth and its companion decision approved a policy of enabling
persons, before engaging in business transactions, to determine with
optimum certainty whether their conduct implicates the federal se-
curities acts. The two decisions rejected the sale-of-business doctrine,
under which four circuits221 had held that stock transferred to effect
the sale of all or part of a business 222 was not necessarily a "security"
within that term's 1933 and 1934 act definitions. 223
Both acts define the term "security" to mean, among other in-
struments, "any . . . stock. ' 224 In the four circuits that had adopted
the sale-of-business doctrine, however, the result had turned on such a
sale's "economic reality. ,225 The primary question concerned control.
Did the purchaser assume control of the business, and thus in reality
consummate a "commercial" transaction said to lie outside the
purview of the federal securities acts? Or did the purchaser act as
a passive investor reasonably expecting profits from the entrepre-
neurial or managerial efforts of others, and thus in reality consum-
mate a "securities" transaction within the purview of those acts?
Landreth and its companion held that the 1933 and 1934 acts'
219. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 685-88; see also Gould, 471 U.S. at 704 (referring
to Landreth).
220. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REv. 527, 539 (1947); see also id. at 534 ("vital difference between initiating policy
... and merely carrying out a formulated policy, indicates the relatively narrow
limits within which choice is fairly open to courts"); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc.
v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.) ("[wle must be wary against
interpolating our notions of policy in the interstices of legislative provisions").
221. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
222. Landreth involved sale of 10001o of a business' stock, 471 U.S. at 683-84;
its companion Gould involved sale of 50%. 471 U.S. at 702.
223. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 687-88; Gould, 471 U.S. at 704.
224. 1933 Act § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1982) (definition applies "[u]nless the
context otherwise requires"); 1934 Act § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982)
(same).
225. See, e.g., Fredericksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150-54 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
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respective definitions of "security" include all transactions involving
instruments that possess the significant characteristics traditionally
associated with stock. 226 These transactions thus implicate the federal
securities acts and their respective antifraud remedies. The Court
proceeded to explain that this holding is consistent with "sound
policy ' 227 because the holding minimizes "uncertainties attending the
applicability of the [the acts which] would hardly be in the best
interests of either party to a transaction." 22 For one thing, the
Court stressed, control is an "often elusive" concept whose deter-
mination itself frequently resolves uncertainty. 229 Moreover, the sale-
of-business doctrine would produce "difficult questions of line-
drawing ' 230 because its application to the sale of 100 percent of a
business' stock would require application to the sale of some lesser
'percentages. "[T]he [a]cts' applicability . . . would rarely be certain
at the time of the transaction, ' 231 but would "depend on findings
of fact made by a court-often only after extensive discovery and
litigation.' '232
226. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 687-88; see also Gould, 471 U.S. at 704.
227. Gould, 471 U.S. at 704; see also Landreth, 471 U.S. at 694 (discussing
"strong policy reasons").
228. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 696.
229. Id. at 697. The 1933 and 1934 acts both impose secondary liability on a
person who controls a primary violator at the time of the primary violation. See
15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982). Section 15 of the 1933 Act,
for example, provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise,
or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding
with one or more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency,
or otherwise, controls any person liable under sections [11 or 12 of the
Act], shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same
extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled
person is liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or
reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of
which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982).
Determining control necessarily requires ascertainment and application of facts
in light of judicial precedent, and Commission interpretations and no-action letters.
One commentator has aptly concluded that these sources provide "no mathematical
standard, no slide rule computation, no certain rule which can infallibly guide
counsel and client." Sommer, Who's 'In Control'?-S.E.C., 21 Bus. LAW. 559,
563 (1966).
230. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 696; see also Gould, 471 U.S. at 705 (discussing
"arbitrary distinctions between transactions covered by the Acts and those that are
not").
231. Gould, 471 U.S. at 705; see also Landreth, 471 U.S. at 696 ("coverage by
the Acts would in most cases be unknown and unknowable to the parties at the
time the stock was sold").
232. Gould, 471 U.S. at 705; see also Landreth, 471 U.S. at 696-97 ("parties
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In the interpretation of section 10(b) a decade earlier, Blue Chip233
approved a policy of avoiding "vexatious litigation" by the adoption
of readily ascertainable standards for determining whether a person
is within a securities remedy's litigant class.2 14 Writing for the Court,
Justice Rehnquist stated:
[1]n the field of federal securities laws governing disclosure of
information even a complaint which by objective standards may
have very little chance of success at trial has a settlement value
to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect of success
at trial so long as he may prevent the suit from being resolved
against him by dismissal or summary judgment. The very pendency
of the lawsuit may frustrate or delay normal business activity of
the defendant which is totally unrelated to the lawsuit. 23"
Blue Chip concluded that a purchaser-seller limitation on section
10(b)'s plaintiff class has advantages "purely as a matter of policy" 23 6
because it "separates in a readily demonstrable manner the group
of plaintiffs who actually purchased or actually sold .. . from the
vastly larger world of potential plaintiffs. ' 23 7 Because one's status
as an actual purchaser or seller is "generally . . . verifiable by
documentation, ' 238 the Court concluded that the limitation avoids
"a shifting and highly fact-oriented disposition" that is not "a
satisfactory basis for a rule of liability imposed on the conduct of
business transactions. "239
4. Refusal to Extend Securities Remedies Beyond Limits
Indicated by the Sources of Congressional Intent
The Supreme Court does more than ascertain the scope of securities
remedies by closely interpreting the various sources of congressional
intent. The Court refuses to extend this scope beyond the limits
indicated by these sources, whether by invoking remedial construction
or by applying common law tort principles.
to a transaction may never know whether they are covered by the Acts until they
engage in extended discovery and litigation").
233. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See supra notes 183-85, 193-203 and accompanying
text for discussion of the case.
234. 421 U.S. at 740.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 739.
237. Id. at 743; see also id. at 747 (plaintiffs' "dealing in the security, whether
by way of purchase or sale, will generally be an objectively demonstrable fact").
238. Id. at 742.
239. Id. at 755.
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a. Remedial Construction
For most of the last half-century, the Court has construed the
securities acts "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to ef-
fectuate [their] remedial purposes. ' 240 The Court's decisions reflect
the canon of statutory construction that remedial statutes-statutes
that afford remedies, or improve or facilitate remedies for enforcing
rights and redressing injuries24 1-- "should be construed broadly to
effectuate [their] purposes. ' 242 The Court continues to recognize the
securities acts' status as remedial legislation, 243 but Hochfelder2" and
240. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
For excellent historical expositions of the federal securities acts' remedial purposes,
see L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1-54, 1007-56 (1983); PAR-
RISH, supra note 140, passim.
The Court did not stress the securities acts' remedial purposes until after President
Roosevelt made his initial appointment to that bench in 1937. In Jones v. SEC,
298 U.S. 1 (1936), the Court struck down a 1933 Act rule that prohibited withdrawal
of a registration statement or amendment without the Commission's consent. The
Court had this to say concerning the Commission's refusal to consent to withdrawal
of the petitioner's registration statement after the Commission had instituted a
stop-order proceeding based on alleged material fraud:
The action of the commission finds no support in right principle or in
law. It is wholly unreasonable and arbitrary. It violates the cardinal
precept upon which the constitutional safeguards of personal liberty
ultimately rest-that this shall be a government of laws-because to the
precise extent that the mere will of an official or an official body is
permitted to take the place of allowable official discretion or to supplant
the standing law as a rule of human conduct, the government ceases to
be one of laws and becomes an autocracy. Against the threat of such
a contingency the courts have always been vigilant, and, if they are to
perform their constitutional duties in the future, must never cease to be
vigilant, to detect and turn aside the danger at its beginning ....
Arbitrary power and the rule of the Constitution cannot both exist. They
are antagonistic and incompatible forces; and one or the other must of
necessity perish whenever they are brought into conflict.
Id. at 23-24.
241. See 3 SUTHERLAND, supra note 143, § 60.02.
242. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (construing section 3(a)(10)
of 1934 Act); see, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964); SEC
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 91 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring);
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953).
243. See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687 (1985);
Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 541 (1984); Herman & MacLean
v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695
(1980); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976); United States v. National Ass'n
of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 725 (1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
244. For discussion of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), see
supra notes 103-21, 174-82 and accompanying text.
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Aaron'45 are typical of securities decisions in which the Court has
specified that statutory language, legislative history, legislative scheme,
and regulatory antecedents mark the outer limits of remedial con-
struction. 24
Hochfelder acknowledged that the 1933 and 1934 acts sought to
achieve "broad remedial goals ' 24 7 that arguably would be served by im-
posing Rule lOb-5 liability for negligence. The Court held, however, that
language, legislative history and the legislative scheme did not permit
imposition of such liability in private damage actions under the Rule.24 8
In Aaron the Commission argued that proof of scienter is not required
in civil enforcement actions to enjoin violations of section 17(a) 249 of
245. For discussion of Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), see supra notes 122-
34 and accompanying text.
246. See also infra note 254.
247. 425 U.S. at 200. According to the statement of purpose, Congress enacted
the 1933 Act "[tlo provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities
sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent
frauds in the sale thereof." 1933 Act, Pub. L. No. 22, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, 74
(1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. (1982)). This purpose was articulated
during debate. See, e.g., 77 CONG. REC. 2918 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Rayburn)
("purpose of this bill is ... to place the buyer on the same plane so far as
available information is concerned, with the seller"); id. at 2919 (remarks of Rep.
Rayburn) ("we seek ... to make available to the prospective purchaser, if he is
wise enough to use it, all the information that is pertinent that would put him on
notice"); id. at 2983 (remarks of Sen. Fletcher); see also S. REP. No. 47, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1933).
According to the statement of purpose, Congress enacted the 1934 Act "[t]o
provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and of over-the-counter markets
operating in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, to prevent
inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets." 1934 Act, Pub.
L. No. 291, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
(1982)); see also id., ch. 404, § 2, 48 Stat. 881, 881-82 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982)) (discussing necessity for regulation as provided in Act).
This purpose too was articulated during debate. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 7862
(1934) (remarks of Rep. Rayburn) ("[tihis measure . . . goes a good deal further
than the regulation of stock exchanges .... It proposes the protection of the
investor against fraud, to give more integrity to securities listed on the exchange");
id. at 7869 (remarks of Rep. Maloney); id. at 7938 (remarks of Rep. Milligan)
("object of this measure is to control credits, control the unfair manipulating
practices, to provide for adequate and honest reports to security holders by the
corporations, to control the unfair practices of officers and directors of corporations
who use inside information obtained in their position of trust"); id. at 8163 (remarks
of Sen. Fletcher); id. at 8186 (remarks of Sen. Byrnes); id. at 8503 (remarks of
Sen. Reynolds); see also S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1934); H.R.
REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 205 (1934) (bill "seeks to regulate the stock
exchanges and the relationships of the investing public to corporations which invite
public investment by listing on such exchanges").
248. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 206.
249. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982). See supra note 128 for the full text of this
section.
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the 1933 Act. 25" The Court, however, parsed the section's three
paragraphs and held that the Commission must establish scienter under
the first but not the second or third. 25 ' The language of section 17(a)
was "simply not amenable to" 25 2 the Commission's proposed inter-
pretation, and the legislative history carried no evidence of congres-
sional intent contrary to the intent indicated by that language. 253 The
securities acts' status as remedial legislation, the Court specified, "will
not justify reading a provision 'more broadly than its language and
the statutory scheme reasonably permit.' ,251 Rather, "if the language
of a provision of the securities laws is sufficiently clear in its context
and not at odds with the legislative history, ' 2 the Court found it
"well settled ' 25 6 that courts may not pass beyond that context and
history with "generalized references to" 2 7 the remedial purposes of
these laws.
b. Tort Principles
In Touche Ross in 1979,258 the Court held that a private right of
action for damages is not implicit in section 17(a) of the 1934 Act. 259
"The question of the existence of a statutory cause of action," the
Court stated at the outset, "is ... one of statutory construction
250. See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 699.
251. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
252. 446 U.S. at 697.
253. See id. at 697-700.
254. Id. at 695 (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578
(1979), which had quoted SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978)); see also Santa
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1977). The Court reaffirmed
Aaron's specification in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See id. at 234.
255. 446 U.S. at 695.
256. Id. For previous decisions in which the Court had specified the textual
limits of remedial construction, see, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33, 45 (1950) (construing Administrative Procedure Act) ("[ilt is the plain duty of
the courts . . . to construe . . . remedial legislation to eliminate, so far as its text
permits, the practices it condemns") (emphasis supplied); Northern Pac. Ry. Co.
v. Concannon, 239 U.S. 382, 386 (1915) (construing statute validating certain
conveyances by railroads) ("a remedial statute, where it is reasonably possible to
do so, must be interpreted so as to embrace the remedies which it was obviously
intended to afford"; however, courts must not adopt "interpretation which would
destroy the express limitations of the statute and cause it to accomplish a purpose
which its text plainly demonstrates it was not intended to reach").
257. 446 U.S. at 695 (quoting Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 578).
258. For discussion of Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979),
see supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
259. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 569 (construing 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1982)).
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• . . limited solely to determining" congressional intent. 260 Argument
"based on tort principles, therefore, is entirely misplaced." ' 26'
Touche Ross determined the existence rather than the scope of a
securities remedy. Once the majority disapproved of tort principles
as a source of congressional intent, however, the Court ascertained
this intent by using the approach to securities interpretation that it
had used in the other decisions discussed in Part II of this Article.
The Court concluded that section 17(a)'s language provided no basis
for implying a private right of action. 262 The Court also concluded
that the 1934 Act's legislative history was silent about whether
Congress intended the section to create a private right26a and that
the legislative scheme provided further justification for the decision
not to imply a private right. 264 Remedial construction, the Court
stated, would not support a result inconsistent with language, history
and scheme. 265 "The ultimate question," the Court concluded, "is
one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks
that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted
into law."126
III. Section 12's Pertinent Legislative Materials
In statutory decisionmaking, the judicial role is to ascertain and
apply legislative intent. The Supreme Court's securities decisions
illustrate that when dispute concerns the scope of a right of action
created by a remedial statute such as the 1933 Act, a court ascertains
this scope more accurately by interpreting the various sources of
intent than by merely-stating a conclusion based on remedial purpose.
Part III interprets section 12's pertinent legislative materials and
presents the Article's thesis that despite the 1933 Act's status as
remedial legislation,. section 12's two subsections do not impose
liability on participants or other non-transferors. Similarly, the per-
tinent legislative materials provide support for the conclusion that
courts may not impose liability for aiding and abetting in section
12 actions.
260. Id. at 568.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 568-71.
263. See id. at 571.
264. See id. at 571-74.
265. See id. at 576-78.
266. Id. at 578.
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A. Section 12 Liability
1. The Language of Section 12
"The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute
is the language itself. '267 Section 12 provides in full:
Any person who-
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section [5 of the Act], or
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the
provisions of section [3 of the Act], other than paragraph (2) of
subsection (a) of said section), by the use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate com-
merce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral com-
munication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact
or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such
untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of such untruth or omission,
shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him,
who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security
with interest ... upon the tender of such security, or for damages
if he no longer owns the security.2 68
Because section 12 decisions since Lennerth and Hill York focus on
the participation theory rather than on statutory language, these
decisions do not aid in the interpretation of that language. The first
two italicized phrases above raise the prospect of imposing liability
on "any person who offers or sells a security." Because suit may
be maintained only by "the person purchasing such security from
him," however, an offeror may incur section 12 liability only if the
267. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 685 (quoting Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 756 (Powell,
J., concurring)); see also supra note 107.
268. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982) (emphasis added). As enacted in 1933, section 12's
two subsections imposed liability on "[a]ny person who sells a security." 1933
Act, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 84 (1933). Section 2(3) provided in relevant part that "[tlhe
term 'sale,' 'sell,' 'offer to sell,' or 'offer for sale' shall include every contract of
sale or disposition of, attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer
to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value." Id. at 74.
In 1954 Congress amended section 2(3) to provide the present distinction between
sales and offers. See Pub. L. No. 577, § 9, 68 Stat. 683, 683 (1954); see also
infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text. The 1954 legislation also amended section
12 to add the words "offers or." See Pub. L. No. 577, 68 Stat. 683, 686 (1954).
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offeror also "sells" the security to the plaintiff.269 Section 12's
language provides no indication of congressional intent, by appli-
cation of tort principles or otherwise, to impose liability based on
one's "participation" in a selling effort. The section's language
indicates that a person who performs what Professor Loss has called
"mechanical activities''270 for the transferor-a person denominated
a "participant" in most decisions-may qualify as a section 12
offeror. The section's language further indicates that the person who
sells the security to the plaintiff-the person from whom the plaintiff
purchases-is the transferor of title to or other interest in the security
for value.
Section 2(3) of the Act defines "offer," "sale" and "sell." A
person other than the transferor may be a "person who offers ...
a security" within the meaning of the Act because section 2(3)
defines "offer" to "include every attempt or offer to dispose of,
or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security,
for value. ' 271 A person may engage in solicitation or similar activity
when the person is not the transferor, and indeed even when no
transfer ever takes place.
Section 2(3) defines " 'sale' or 'sell' " to "include every contract
of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for
value. ' 27 2 By distinguishing the statutory sale from broadly defined
statutory offers, section 2(3) indicates a distinction between the
completed sale and prior activities that cause the sale. This distinction
is consistent with the conclusion that a person's pre-completion
activities may qualify the person as one "who offers . . . a security,"
but that the person who sells the security to the plaintiff is the
person who completes the transaction by transferring title to or other
interest in the security for value.
In Blue Chip273 the Supreme Court recognized congressional intent
to distinguish a completed sale from prior activities that cause a
269. The 1933 Act does not define "purchase," but the term "should be in-
terpreted in a manner complementary to 'sale' which is defined in § 2(3)." SEC
v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485, 489 (2d. Cir), cert. denied sub nom. Santa
Monica Bank v. SEC, 364 U.S. 819 (1960); see also 1 Loss, supra note 104, at
548 ("term 'purchased,' which is not separately defined in the [1933] Act, presumably
is complementary to the word 'sold' or 'sell' ").
270. See Loss, supra note 104, at 544.
271. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1982). Section 2(3)'s definition of "offer" considerably
broadens the common law concept. For discussion of the common law concept of
offer, see, e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERLLO, CONTRACTS 31-47 (3d ed. 1987).
272. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1982).
273. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), is discussed
supra notes 183-85, 193-203, 233-39 and accompanying text.
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sale. The Court held that because section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5274
operate against fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security," private damage actions under these provisions may
be maintained only by actual purchasers or sellers. 275 In dissent,
Justice Blackmun argued for a broader conception of "sale ' 276 and
thus of "seller. 2 77 According to Justice Blackmun, "the word 'sale'
ordinarily and naturally may be understood to mean, not only a
single, individualized act transferring property from one party to
another, but also the generalized event of public disposal of property
through advertisement, auction, or some other market mechanism."
278
The Court rejected Justice Blackmun's analysis because "extension
of the word 'sale' to include offers is quite incompatible with
Congress' separate definition and use of the terms in the 1933 and
1934 Acts.
'279
Section 12's provision for rescissory relief is consistent with the
conclusion that the 1933 Act confines seller status to the transferor.
Scattered common law authority exists for the proposition that a
plaintiff might obtain rescission against a defendant who was not
a party to the contract in question; 2 0 the overwhelming weight of
common law authority, however, restricts rescission to contracting
parties. 211 Congress may expand the scope of rescission by statute.
Construing the Act to confine seller status-to the transferor, however,
is consistent with the conclusion that Congress did not intend section
12 to resto'e a status quo that never existed by requiring one or
more of a wide range of persons (frequently the transferor's officers,
directors, employees, brokers, lawyers or underwriters) to accept
tender of securities in which they had never held an interest.
282
274. For the full texts of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, see supra notes 104-
105.
275. 421 U.S. at 725, 731, 734.
276. Id. at 764 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 765 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
278. Id. at 764 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 733 n.5 (citations omitted); see also id. at 756 (Powell, J., concurring)
("1933 Act ... defines 'offer to sell' as something distinct from a sale").
280. See, e.g., Peterson v. McManus, 187 Iowa 522, 574, 172 N.W. 460, 469
(1919); Hedden v. Griffin, 136 Mass. 229, 232 (1884); Keskal v. Modrakowski,
249 N.Y. 406, 408, 164 N.E. 333, 333 (1928) (per curiam) (dictum).
281. See, e.g., 1 H. BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS AND
CANCELLATION OF WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS §§ 1, 16, 30 (2d ed. Lee 1929); 5 A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1105 (1964); see also Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities
Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 231-32 (1933); Teass, Duty of Directors and Others as
Prescribed By Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 20 VA. L. REV. 817, 834
(1934).
282. Section 12 authorizes the purchaser to sue "to recover the consideration
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2. The Legislative Scheme and Regulatory Antecedents
a. Participant Liability
Section 12's language arguably does not preclude the interpretation
that in some circumstances a plaintiff might purchase a security
from a person who engages in mechanical activities for a transferor.
In common parlance, a person may lawfully offer or sell property
without necessarily being the transferor of title to or other interest
in that property. Because the 1933 Act's legislative history does not
illuminate the contours of the seller category that Congress intended
to create, interpretation proceeds to the legislative scheme and the
1933 Act's regulatory antecedents.
These extrinsic sources support the threshold inference that Con-
gress did not intend to impose section 12 liability for "participating"
in a selling effort, no matter how courts might determine participation
and no matter what an alleged participant's motive might have been.
The 1933 Act's drafters and enactors were influenced by existing
blue sky laws and by the Uniform Sale of Securities Act, a model
blue sky statute approved in 1929.83 Like the 1933 Act, the typical
blue sky law and the Uniform Act required registration of securities 28
and created private rights of action for fraudulent sales or sales in
violation of the registration requirements. 285 The Uniform Act ex-
pressly imposed liability on the seller and on persons who "personally
participated" with the seller in making a fraudulent or violative
sale.286 By early 1933, the blue sky laws of twelve states and the
territory of Hawaii had created private rights of action that expressly
paid for [the] security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income thereon,
upon tender of the security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security."
See supra .text accompanying note 268. Section 12's provision for rescissory relief
helps determine the section's defendant class, but membership in that class does
not depend on whether the purchaser tenders the security. In the absence of tender,
some courts have awarded damages under the section against persons other than
the transferor. See, e.g., Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1362 (5th Cir. 1981).
Decisions such as Junker are inconsistent with this Article's thesis that participants
and other non-transferors are not proper section 12 defendants and thus may not
incur liability under either subsection of that section.
283. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
284. See UNIF. SALE OF SEC. ACT §§ 6-8 (1929), quoted in Handbook, supra
note 140, at 182-92. Sections 4 and 5 of the Uniform Act exempted certain securities
and transactions from the registration requirements. See id. at 177-82 (quoting
UNnF. SALE OF SEC. ACT §§ 4, 5 (1929)).
285. See UNtF. SALE OF SEC. ACT §§ 15, 16 (1929), quoted in Handbook, supra
note 140, at 198-200. The Uniform Act's antifraud provisions and registration
requirements reached offers or sales made "in" or "within" the state.
286. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
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imposed liability on persons who "participated" in making fraudulent
or violative sales. 28 7 Liabilities and obligations expressly grounded in
participation are found elsewhere in the 1933 Act and in four of
the later five Roosevelt administration securities acts. 28 Section 9
of the 1934 Act, enacted by the same Congress that enacted the
1933 Act, 2 9 creates a private right of action that expressly imposes
liability on participants.
The legislative scheme and the 1933 Act's regulatory antecedents
thus demonstrate that Congress knew of the participation concept
and employed it in that Act and throughout the unified program
of securities regulation. In this circumstance, section 12's failure to
impose express liability for participation supports the inference that
Congress did not intend that the section impose participant liability.
Lower courts have imposed participant liability ever since the Len-
nerth decision by applying tort principles. 290 This negative inference
thus is consistent with the conclusion, indicated by section 12's
language,291 that Congress did not intend to impose section 12 liability
based on such principles.
i. The Uniform Sale of Securities Act and the Blue Sky Laws
Section 16(1) of the Uniform Act 292 authorized a purchaser to sue
"the person making [a] sale [fraudulently or in violation of that
Act's registration requirements] and every director, officer or agent
of or for such seller, if such director, officer or agent shall have
personally participated or aided in any way in making such sale.
' 293
By the time Congress began considering federal securities legislation
early in 1933, the blue sky laws of twelve states and the territory
of Hawaii expressly imposed liability on persons who "participated"
287. See infra note 294 and accompanying text.
288. See infra notes 295-374 and accompanying text.
289. Both acts were enacted by the 73d Congress. See supra note 148.
290. See supra notes 49-98 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text.
292. See UNIF. SALE OF SEC. ACT § 16(1) (1929), quoted in Handbook, supra
note 140, at 200. Section 15 of the Uniform Act authorized the state securities
agency to seek injunctive relief against direct violators and "any other person or
persons ... in any way participating in or about to participate in . . . fraudulent
practices or acting in violation of this act . . . ." UNIrF. SALE OF SEC. ACT § 15
(1929), quoted in Handbook, supra note 140, at 199. By early 1933, the blue sky
laws of three states and Hawaii had adopted section 15 verbatim. See 1931 Fla.
Laws 819-21; 1931 Haw. Sess. Laws 350-52; 1929 Iowa Acts 24-25; 1929 Vt. Laws
120-21.
293. UNIF. SALE OF SEC. ACT § 16(1) (1929).
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in making fraudulent or violative sales. 294 Against this backdrop,
294. The blue sky laws created defendant classes that were the same, or nearly
the same, as the defendant class created by section 16(1) of the Uniform Act. See
1931 Ala. Acts 799-800 ("every agent of or for such seller who shall have participated
or aided in any way in making such sale"); 1931 Ark. Acts 308-309 ("every director
or officer of the issuer ... who shall have participated in making such sale");
1931 Fla. Laws 821 (same as section 16(1)); 1931 Haw. Sess. Laws 352 (same);
1925 Ind. Acts 106 (same); 1929 Iowa Acts 25-25 (same); 1929 Kan. Sess. Laws
232-33 (same); 1926 Ky. Acts 238-39 (same); 1929 Mich. Pub. Acts 316 ("every
agent of or for such seller who shall have participated or aided in any way in
making such sale"); 1929 Mo. Laws 409-10 (same as section 16(1)); 1927 N.C.
Sess. Laws 473-74 (same); 1929 Utah Laws 140 (same); 1929 Vt. Laws 121 (same).
A thirteenth state, Wisconsin, adopted participant liability on May 23, 1933, four
days before the 1933 Act's enactment. See 1933 Act, Pub. L. No. 22, ch. 38, 48
Stat. 74 (1933); 1933 Wis. Laws 404-406 ("any issuer, dealer, or other person ...
who shall have participated or aided in any way in making such sale").
No state adopted the Uniform Act after 1933 because the 1933 Act left it materially
deficient. See supra note 140. The Uniform Securities Act (1985), which superseded
the 1956 Uniform Securities Act, imposes liability on "[a] person who willfully
participates in an act or transaction" constituting market manipulation. UNIF. SEC.
ACT (1985) § 605(c), 7B U.L.A. 80 (Supp. 1987).
The blue sky laws of 19 states presently create private rights of action that
expressly impose participant liability. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2003 (1967)
("any person ... who ... participated in ... the unlawful sale or purchase
... "); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25500 (West 1977) ("[a]ny person who willfully par-
ticipates in" manipulative act or transaction); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.211(1) (West
Supp. 1987) ("every director, officer, partner, or agent of or for the seller [who]
has personally participated ... in making the sale"); id. § 517.211(2) (same); GA.
CODE ANN. § 10-5-14(b) (1982 & Supp. 1987) ("every dealer, limited dealer, salesman,
or limited salesman who participates in any material way" in fraudulent or violative
sale); HAW. REV. STAT. § 485-20(a) (1985) ("every director, officer, or agent of
or for the seller [who] has personally participated ... in any way in making the
sale"); IDAHO CODE § 30-1446(2) (1980) ("every broker-dealer or salesman who
participates ... in the sale"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.13(A) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1987) ("each underwriter, dealer or salesperson who shall have par-
ticipated ... in any way in making [the] sale"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.502(4)
(West Supp. 1987) ("[any person who willfully and knowingly participates" in
manipulative act or transaction); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51.714(B) (West Supp.
1987) ("every dealer or salesman who participates in any material way" in fraudulent
or violative sale); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-307(2) (1985) ("every broker-dealer
or salesman who participates" in fraudulent or violative sale); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 58-13B-40(E) (1986) ("[a] person who willfully participates" in manipulative act
or transaction); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-17 (1985) ("every director, officer,
salesman, or agent of or for [the] seller who shall have participated ... in any
way in making [the] sale"); Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (Anderson 1985)
("every person who has participated in ...making .. . [the] sale or contract for
sale"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 408(b) (West 1987) ("[e]very person who
materially participates ... in a sale"); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3) (1985) ("every
person who participates ... in the sale"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-501(c)
(Purdon Supp. 1987) ("[alny person who wilfully participates in any act or trans-
action"); S.D. CODIRED LAWS ANN. § 47-31-133 (1983) ("each underwriter, broker
or agent who shall have participated ... in any way in making [the] sale, and
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Congress imposed section 12 liability on persons who sell securities,
but not on participants.
ii. The 1933 Act
Without imposing participant liability in section 12, Congress made
participation central to the 1933 Act's regulation of securities dis-
tribution. Issuers rarely seek access to the securities markets through
direct financing; rather, they ordinarily distribute securities through
investment banks, promoters or other underwriters. Consistent with
its investor-protection purpose, 295 the Act defines a wide range of
intermediaries. Section 2(11)'s definition of "underwriter" provides
in relevant part:
The term "underwriter" means any person who [1] has purchased
from an issuer with a view to, or [2] offers or sells for an issuer
in connection with, the distribution of any security, or [3] par-
ticipates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such
undertaking, or [4] participates or has a participation in the direct
or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking
In 1933, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
stated that the section 2(11) definition reaches persons "who may
be termed participants in the underwriting .. . who may or may
not be formal parties to the underwriting contract. ' 297 Congress
deliberately pinpointed participation as the standard. In the bill
initially approved by the House, the definition had reached any
person "who . .. has an interest in [a distribution], or engages or
participates in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such un-
dertaking. "298 The conference committee amended the definition.
... each of its officers and directors ... who shall have participated in making
[the] sale"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4225 (1984) ("every director, officer or agent
of or for [the] seller who shall have participated . . . in any way in making [the]
sale"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 551.59(3) (West 1986) ("[any person who willfully
participates in" manipulative act or transaction).
295. See supra note 247.
296. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1982) (brackets supplied). Section 2(11) further provides:
[B]ut such term shall not include a person whose interest is limited to
a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual
and customary distributors' or sellers' commission. As used in this par-
agraph the term "issuer" shall include, in addition to an issuer, any
person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or
any person under direct or indirect common control with the issuer.
Id.
297. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1933).
298. Id.
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Congress enacted section 2(11) in the amended form, which deleted
reference to interest and then expanded participation's ambit. The
conference committee was explicit: "The test is one of participation
in the underwriting rather than that of a mere interest in it."1299
Underwriters are subject to civil3°° and criminal30 1 liability for
violating the registration or prospectus requirements of section 5 of
the Act. Section 5 prohibits any person from directly or indirectly
offering or selling any security in violation of the section's require-
ments.102 Section 4(1), however, states that section 5 "shall not apply
to ... transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter,
or dealer. "303
Three Commission rules have helped shape the meaning of "par-
ticipation" under section 2(1 1).3 04 Courts otherwise determine par-
ticipation on a case-by-case basis.30 5 The question is whether the
would-be underwriter "engaged in steps necessary to the distribution
of security issues." 3°0
Participation reaches a broad range of intermediaries. In SEC v.
Culpepper,07 for example, the Second Circuit affirmed a judgment
that found an individual defendant to be an underwriter and enjoined
him from offering or selling unregistered securities. The corporate
issuer had exchanged shares of its unregistered stock for a Canadian
299. H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1933).
300. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(1), 77t (1982). Underwriters are also subject to civil
liability under section 11 arising from materially misleading registration statements.
See id. § 77k(a)(5) (1982).
301. See id. § 77x (1982).
302. Id. § 77e (1982).
303. Id. § 77d(l) (1982).
304. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.137 (1987) (regarding certain publications or distribution
of information); id. § 230.142(a).(1987) (terms "participates" and "participation"
in section 2(11) shall not include the interest of person who is not in privity of
contract or in control relationship with issuer, who has no association with any
principal underwriter, and who merely purchases for investment some or all of
distribution's securities that remain unsold after specified time period); id. § 230.143
(1987) (terms shall not apply to foreign governments in specified circumstances).
305. See, e.g., Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins & Sullivan, 550 F.2d 1303, 1311.-
12 (2d Cir. 1977); Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 374 (10th Cir. 1973); SEC v.
International Chem. Dev. Corp., 469 F.2d 20, 28-29, 31, 32-33 (10th Cir. 1972);
SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181, 188 (7th Cir. 1966); SEC v. Chinese Consol.
Benev. Ass'n, 120 F.2d 738, 741 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941); SEC
v. Pig'n Whistle Corp., 359 F. Supp. 219, 220, 221 (N.D. Ill. 1973); SEC v.
North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 106, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd
in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 424 F.2d 63, 74 (2d Cir. 1970).
306. SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benev. Ass'n, 120 F.2d 738, 741 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
307. 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959).
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company's assets. The Canadian company in turn had transferred
these shares to its thirty-one stockholders. Twenty-six of the stock-
holders had granted one Herschorn, irrevocable powers of attorney to
effect sales of their respective shares. The district court found that
the Herschorn group was in common control with, or under the
control of, the corporate issuer. 08 Accordingly, under section 2(11)'s
last sentence, °9 Herschorn and other group members themselves were
issuers for purposes of determining underwriter status of subsequent
persons in the chain of distribution. Herschorn effected sales of
several thousand unregistered shares to various brokers and dealers
who later resold the shares. The district court found that these
brokers and dealers were underwriters because they had purchased
from the Herschorn group (and thus, by operation of section 2(11)'s
last sentence, from an issuer) with a view to distribution.310 Defendant
Grayson, however, had purchased from other persons and not from
an issuer (the corporate issuer, Herschorn, or any other member of
the control group). In the Commission's civil enforcement action,
the district court found that Grayson had ongoing relations with
members of the control group and thus apparently knew their in-
tentions. Citing the 1933 Act's purpose "of protecting the investing
public through the disclosure of adequate information,""' the Second
Circuit held that Grayson was an underwriter because he had 'par-
ticipated' in the underwriting if that word is to be given a reasonable
interpretation.' '312
iii. The 1934 Act
Section 9 of the 1934 Act 313 creates a private right of action that
expressly imposes liability on participants. The section contains "sev-
eral clear ... provisions reinforced by penal and civil sanctions,
aimed at those manipulative ... practices which had been dem-
onstrated to fulfill no useful function. ' 31 4 Section 9(a) makes it
unlawful for any person, acting with the purposes stated in that section,
to engage in enumerated manipulative acts or transactions in securities
registered on a national securities exchange.3"' Sections 9(b)-(d) au-
308. See id. at 246; SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 716,
738 (1958), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959).
309. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
310. 270 F.2d at 246.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1982).
314. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934).
315. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1982).
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thorize the Commission to promulgate rules concerning manipulative
practices in put and call options 16 but not in registered warrants,
rights or convertible securities .1
7
Section 9(a) operates against two broad categories of acts or
transactions in or concerning securities covered by the section. The
first category consists of acts or transactions that, by the section's
express terms, may be done either by one person or by joint action
of more than one person. Section 9(a)(2) prohibits any person, "alone
or with one or more other persons," from effecting a series of
transactions that create actual or apparent active trading or raise
or depress a security's price.31 Section 9(a)(6) prohibits any person,
"either alone or with one or more other persons," from effecting
a series of transactions for the purpose of pegging, fixing or sta-
bilizing a security's price in violation of Commission rules.319
Section 9(a)'s second category consists of acts or transactions that,
by their nature, are frequently done by one person. Section 9(a)(1)
prohibits wash sales and matched orders.3 20 Section 9(a)(3) prohibits
the circulation or dissemination of manipulative information by any
broker, dealer or other enumerated person.32" ' Section 9(a)(4) prohibits
any such person from making any statement that the person knew
or had reasonable ground to believe was materially false or mis-
leading.3 22 Section 9(a)(5) prohibits any person from circulating or
disseminating such information or from making any such statement
for consideration received from a broker, dealer or other enumerated
person. 323
Section 9(e) creates a private right of action for damages in favor
of purchasers or sellers injured by any willful manipulative act or
transaction prohibited by section 9.324 Based on testimony before
316. Id. § 78i(b), (c) (1982). The Commission has not promulgated prohibitory
rules concerning these options, but has promulgated Rule 9b-1, which requires
option disclosure documents. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.9b-1 (1987).
317. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(d) (1982).
318. Id. § 78i(a)(2) (1982).
319. Id. § 78i(a)(6) (1982).
320. Id. § 78i(a)(1)(A) (1982) (wash sales); id. § 78i(a)(1)(B), (C) (matched orders).
Wash sales are transactions that involve no change in beneficial ownership. Matched
orders are orders for purchase/sale of a security, entered with knowledge that
orders of substantially the same size, at substantially the same time and price, have
been or will be entered by the same or different persons for the sale/purchase of
that security. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 205 n.25 (1976).
321. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(3) (1982).
322. Id. § 78i(a)(4) (1982).
323. Id. § 78i(a)(5) (1982).
324. Id. § 78i(e) (1982). For the text of section 9(e), see infra text accompanying
note 326.
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the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,3 25 section 9(e)
imposes liability on participants. The section provides:
Any person who willfully participates in any act or transaction
in violation of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section, shall
be liable to any person who shall purchase or sell any security
at a price which was affected by such act or transaction, and the
person so injured may sue . . . to recover the damages sustained
as a result of any such act or transaction. 26
Section 9(e) imposes liability on more than defendants who "par-
ticipate" in the sense that they act jointly with one or more other
persons to do an act or transaction. By authorizing suit against
defendants who willfully participate in "any" violative act or trans-
action, the section also imposes liability on defendants who, like
section 12 participants, perform mechanical activities in an act or
transaction done by another person.127
iv. The 1939 Act
Congress continued participation's express role in the Trust In-
denture Act of 1939328 and in the two securities acts enacted the
following year. 29 Closely integrated with,33 0 and codified in the same
325. The Committee's report discussed testimony about "a financial writer on
a great New York newspaper [who] was discovered to have been a regular participant
in the profits of a free-lance trader, without obligation except to publicize the
stocks of the trader." S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934).
326. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1982).
327. See supra note 270 and accompanying text. Two commentators have noted
that reported section 9(e) decisions are "conspicuously scarce." 3 BROMBERG &
LOWENFELS, supra note 104, § 8.4(410). Indeed, in 1961 Professor Loss could find
only six reported decisions touching on section 9(e) in its first 27 years. 3 Loss,
supra note 104, at 1748. By 1969, he counted 15. 6 id. at 3860 (Supp. 1969).
Section 9(e)'s relative disuse, which does not bear on congressional intent to
impose participant liability in 1934, stems partly from the unanticipated development
of implied private rights of action, particularly section 17(a) of the 1933 Act (in
circuits that recognize a private right under that section) and section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5. Relative disuse also stems from section 9's own limited scope and
difficulties of proof. Section 9(a) applies only to manipulation in securities registered
on a national securities exchange and requires proof of manipulative purpose;
section 9(e) reaches only willful misconduct and contains a causation requirement,
permitting only damages "sustained as a result of" the manipulative act or trans-
action and requiring the plaintiff to show that the purchase or sale occurred "at
a price which was affected by" the act or transaction.
328. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1982). On the 1939 Act and its background,
see, e.g., HAZEN, supra note 106, at 554-65; 2 Loss, supra note 104, at 720-53;
SELIGMAN, supra note 152, at 189-97.
329. See infra notes 347-74 and accompanying text.
330. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77ddd, 77hhh (1982).
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chapter as"' the 1933 Act, the 1939 Act defines "underwriter" in
"exactly the same terms'' 332 as the initial act.
The 1939 Act regulates distribution of notes, bonds, debentures
and other evidence of indebtedness (whether or not secured) and
certificates representing these interests.333 To qualify a non-exempt",
distribution of debt securities, the issuer-obligor must appoint one
or more independent trustees to "protect and enforce the rights and
to represent the interests" of the debt securityholders. 33 At least
one trustee (the "institutional trustee")336 must be a corporation that
is organized and doing business under the laws of the United States
or of a state and that has combined capital and surplus of at least
$150,000.317
To help assure independence under the indenture, each trustee
must be free of enumerated "conflicting interests, ' 331 several of
which implicate underwriters. A would-be trustee is disqualified: (1)
if the trustee or any of its directors or executive officers is an
underwriter for an obligor on the debt securities;339 (2) if the trustee
directly or indirectly controls, is directly or indirectly controlled by,
or is under direct or indirect common control with an underwriter
for such an obligor;3 40 (3) if with certain exceptions, the trustee or
any of its directors or executive officers is a director, officer, partner,
employee, appointee or representative of an underwriter (other than
the trustee itself) for such an obligor who is currently engaged in
the business of underwriting; 341 (4) if more than enumerated per-
centages of the trustee's voting securities are beneficially owned by
an underwriter for such an obligor, or by any of the underwriter's
directors, partners or executive officers; 342 or (5) if the trustee owns,
beneficially or in a representative capacity, more than enumerated
331. Id. ch. 2A (1982).
332. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1939); S. REP. No. 248, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1939); S. REP. No. 1619, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 7 (1938). For
discussion of the 1933 Act's definition, see supra notes 296-312 and accompanying
text.
333. See 15 U.S.(C. § 77ddd(a)(1) (1982).
334. See id. § 77ddd (1982) (exempting certain securities and transactions from
1939 Act's provisions).
335. Id. § 77bbb(a)(1) (1982).
336. Id. § 77jjj(a)(2) (1982).
337. Id.
338. Id. § 77jjj(b) (1982).
339. Id. § 77jjj(b)(2) (1982).
340. Id. § 77jjj(b)(3) (1982).
341. Id. § 77jjj(b)(4) (1982).
342. Id. § 77jjj(b)(5) (1982).
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percentages of any class of securities of an underwriter for such
obligor.143
Congress determined that although "[i]t is difficult in many cases
quantitatively to estimate the effect of too close affiliations ...
with underwriters of [the obligor's] securities, . . . [iut is clear ...
that the existence of such relationships does have a tendency to
dilute the loyalty of the indenture trustee." 344 By adopting the 1933
Act's "underwriter" definition, including its participation cate-
gories, 345 the 1939 Act provides broad protection to debt security-
holders. The 1939 Act preserves trustees' independence not only
against conflicting interests involving underwriters who enjoy con-
tractual or other direct relations with an issuer-obligor, but also
against conflicting interests involving other persons who engage in
steps necessary to distribution. 346
v. The Investment Company Act of 1940
The Investment Company Act of 1940147 regulates most issuers
that engage, or propose to engage, in the business of investing,
reinvesting or trading in securities.3 48 Investors typically purchase
shares in investment companies, such as mutual funds, to secure
greater diversification and professional management than they could
readily secure individually. Non-exempt investment companies349 must
register with the Commission350 and provide periodic disclosure.35
A registered investment company is subject to the Act's provisions
343. Id. § 77jjj(b)(6) (1982).
344. S. REP. No. 248, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1939); S. REP. No. 1619, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1938).
345. See 1939 Act § 303(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77ccc(4) (1982). With respect to the
1939 Act's definition of "underwriter," the Commission has excluded from the
participation categories persons similar to those excluded from the 1933 Act's
definition by Rule 142. See 17 C.F.R. § 260.3(4)-3 (1987). Rule 142 is discussed
supra note 304.
346. Courts have not had occasion to construe the "underwriter" definition's
"participation" categories in actions arising under the 1939 Act or either of the
1940 acts. For discussion of the categories' reach in actions arising under the 1933
Act, see supra notes 305-12 and accompanying text.
347. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1982). On the Investment Company Act and
its background, see, e.g., HAZEN, supra note 106, at 566-625; SELIGMAN, supra
note 152, at 222-31.
348. "Investment company" is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1982). Exemptions
from that definition are found in subsections (b) and (c) of that section. See id.
§ 80a-3(b), (c) (1982).
349. See id. § 80a-6 (1982) (exempting certain investment companies from Act's
provisions).
350. Id. § 80a-8 (1982).
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regulating pricing and distribution of the company's securities, pro-
hibiting enumerated conflicts of interest, and regulating the com-
pany's internal governance structure.
To achieve its investor-protection purpose,352 the Act regulates
both investment companies and their intermediaries. Certain of the
Act's provisions operate against only "principal underwriters," which
the Act. defines as persons who as principals purchase securities from
the issuer for distribution.3" To reach other persons who engage in
steps necessary to distribution, however, other provisions operate
against "underwriters." Section 2(a)(40) adopts the 1933 Act's "un-
derwriter" definition, including the participation categories.3 54
Participation thus plays a role not only in the Investment Company
Act's registration and periodic disclosure requirements, but also in
its ongoing regulation of registered companies. Section 6(a)(3) ex-
empts from the Act's provisions certain investment companies that
have been reorganized under court supervision unless, among other
things, any security of the reorganized company thereafter is offered
or sold to the public by the issuer or "by or through any under-
writer." 3" Section 6(d) authorizes the Commission to promulgate
rules exempting closed-end investment companies, 3 6 none of whose
securities have been or are proposed to be publicly sold, by the
issuer or "by ...any underwriter," to persons not residents of the
state under whose laws the company was created. 357 Section 31(a)
requires "every underwriter" of a registered investment company to
maintain, in accordance with the Commission's rules, the accounts
351. Id. § 80a-29 (1982).
352. See id. § 80a-l(b) (1982) (stating that Congress sought to protect "the
national public interest and the interest of investors").
353. Id. § 80a-2(a)(29) (1982). For Investment Company Act provisions that
operate against principal underwriters, see, e.g., id. § 80a-9 (1982) (persons ineligible
to serve as principal underwriter); id. § 80a-10 (restrictions on employing registered
investment company's directors, officers or employees as principal underwriter); id.
§ 80a-11 (restrictions on offers by principal underwriter to exchange securities); id.
§ 80a-15 (requiring written contracts between company and any principal under-
writer); id. § 80a-17 (prohibiting certain transactions by principal underwriters).
354. See id. § 80a-2(a)(40) (1982). For discussion of the 1933 Act's definition,
see supra notes 296-312 and accompanying text. The Investment Company Act
"declared that the national public interest and the interest of investors are adversely
affected . . . when investment companies are organized, operated, managed, or
their portfolio securities are selected, in the interest of . . .underwriters ...rather
than in the interest of all classes of such companies' security holders." 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-l(b)(2).
355. Id. § 80a-6(a)(3) (1982).
356. See id. §§ 80a-4(3), 80a-5(a) (1982) (defining "closed-end" investment com-
pany).
357. Id. § 80a-6(d) (1982).
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and records necessary to satisfy the Act's periodic disclosure re-
quirements .358
The Act further makes it unlawful for any registered diversified
company359 "to make any commitment as underwriter" unless the
company meets enumerated financial-stability requirements. 3+° A reg-
istered investment company may not "underwrite securities issued
by other persons" unless the underwriting is authorized by a majority
of the company's outstanding voting securities.3 6' No voting-trust
certificate relating to any security of a registered investment company
may be offered, sold or delivered after sale by the company, the
issuer or "any underwriter" of the certificate.3 62 In connection with
public offerings of securities of certain registered investment com-
panies, the Act prohibits distribution of sales literature by the issuer
or "any underwriter" unless copies of the literature are filed with
the Commission. 6 The Act makes it unlawful for registered in-
vestment companies to issue and sell, directly or through "any ...
underwriter," periodic payment plan certificates that fail to meet
pricing standards mandated by the Act.364
vi. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940365 was enacted simultaneously
with, and is codified in the same chapter as,366 the Investment
Company Act. The Advisers Act regulates persons who, for com-
pensation, engage in the business of advising others, either directly
or through publications or writings, concerning the value of securities
or the advisability of investing in, purchasing or selling securities.3 67
Section 202(a)(11) excludes certain persons from this definition and
thus from the Advisers Act's regulation;3 68 section 203 exempts certain
358. Id. § 80a-31(a) (1982).
359. Id. § 80a-4(3), 80a-5(b) (1982) (defining "diversified company").
360. Id. § 80a-12(c) (1982).
361. Id. § 80a-13(a)(2) (1982).
362. Id. § 80a-20(b) (1982).
363. Id. § 80a-24(b) (1982).
364. Id. § 80a-27 (1982).
365. Id. § 80b-I to 80b-21 (1982). On the Investment Advisers Act and its
background, see, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
186-92 (1963); HAZEN, supra note 106, at 626-37; SELIGMAN, supra note 152, at
222-31.
366. See 15 U.S.C. ch. 2D (1982).
367. See id. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1982).
368. Id.
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investment advisers from the Act's registration provisions but not
from its antifraud provisions. 69
The Advisers Act requires non-exempt investment advisers to
register3 70 and file periodic reports37" ' with the Commission. The
Commission may impose sanctions, ranging from censure to sus-
pension or revocation of registration, on advisers who are found
after a hearing to have committed specified crimes or securities law
violations. " 2 Sanctions may be imposed on an adviser who "is per-
manently or temporarily enjoined by order, judgment, or decree of
any court of competent jurisdiction from acting as an . .. under-
writer, . . . or from engaging in or contining any conduct or practice in
connection with any such activity, or in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security. 373 The Advisers Act adopts the 1933 Act's
"underwriter" definition,3 74 including the participation categories.
The Advisers Act thus authorizes the Commission to sanction an
adviser enjoined for misconduct in facilitating securities distribution,
even if the adviser did not enjoy contractual or other direct relations
with an issuer at the time of the misconduct.
b. 1933 Act Seller Status
In its interpretation of the legislative scheme in Touche Ross, 375
the Supreme Court drew a negative inference from contrasts created
by sections that "flanked ' 376 the 1934 Act provision at issue but
that concerned matters largely unrelated to that provision. In similar
fashion, section 11 of the 1933 Act 377 creates contrasts with the
adjacent section 12. Section lI's effect, however, transcends the
textual contiguity present in Touche Ross because the two 1933 Act
sections are closely related in delimiting the express private relief
available under the Act.378 The significant contrasts created by section
369. Id. § 80b-3(b) (1982).
370. Id. § 80b-3 (1982).
371. Id. § 80b-4 (1982).
372. Id. § 80b-3(e) (1982).
373. Id. § 80b-3(e)(3) (1982).
374. See id. § 80b-2(a)(20) (1982). For discussion of the 1933 Act's definition,
see supra notes 296-312 and accompanying text.
375. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). See supra notes
169-73, 258-66 and accompanying text for discussion of the case.
376. 442 U.S. at 571.
377. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982).
378. The circuits are divided on the question whether section 17(a) of the Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982), supports an implied private right of action. When
presented with the question, most lower courts have answered it in the affirmative.
See HAZEN, supra note 106, at 507 & nn.10-11 (citing decisions).
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11 support the inference that, as the Act's language indicates, the
Act does not impose seller status on non-transferors.3 79
Section 11(a) authorizes actions by "any person acquiring [the]
security" against a wide array of expressly enumerated defendants,
including most of the major non-transferors involved in registered
offerings.3 s0 Plaintiffs may sue the issuer and every other person
who signed the registration statement; the issuer's principal officers
and its directors or partners; persons named with their consent in
the registration statement as being or about to become directors or
partners; persons named with their consent as experts; and every
underwriter."' These non-transferors are frequently among the per-
sons named as "participants" in section 12 actions. Section 12's
failure to provide a similar express enumeration supports the inference
that Congress did not intend to include non-transferors as sellers in
sections 12's provision that "[a]ny person who offers or sells a
security ... shall be liable to the person purchasing such security
from him."3 82
Section 11 reinforces this negative inference by establishing a
framework that is consistent with a multimember defendant class
that includes non-transferors. Section 1 1(f)33 specifies joint and sev-
eral liability and expressly provides for contribution. The 1933 and
1934 acts expressly provide for contribution in provisions which
create private rights of action that contemplate multiple defendants.8 4
Speaking about section 11(f), Professor Loss has written that the
"obvious purpose" '385 was to avoid the common law rule that in
the absence of statute, no right to contribution existed among joint
tortfeasors.38 6 Section 12's failure to provide for contribution is
consistent with the conclusion that Congress intended suit under that
section to reach only one defendant.
Section 11(e) supports the conclusion that, as section 11(a) in-
dicates, this one defendant is the transferor. 387 Section 11 (e) authorizes
379. See supra notes 267-82 and accompanying text.
380. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1982).
381. Id. The issuer and its principal officers are section 11 defendants because
under section 6(a), id. § 77f(a) (1982), they must sign the registration statement.
382. Id. § 771 (1982), quoted in full supra text accompanying note 268.
383. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1982).
384. In addition to section 11, see id. §§ 78i(e), 78r(b) (1982).
385. 3 Loss, supra note 104, at 1737.
386. Concerning the common law rule, see, e.g., 3 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY,
supra note 70, § 10.2, at 39; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 70, § 50, at 336; S.
WILLISTON, II A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 345, at 1023 & n.19 (rev.
ed. 1936).
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plaintiffs to recover damages based on the difference between: (1)
the amount paid for the security; and (2) the security's value when
suit is brought, or the price at which the security is disposed of
before suit or before judgment.38 As enacted in 1933, section 11(e)
and section 12 provided for identical rescissory relief.8 9 In the months
before enactment of the 1934 Act, section 11 was among the 1933
Act's most criticized provisions. 390 Among other criticism, some com-
mentators stated that by authorizing rescissory relief against remote
defendants, section 11 unnecessarily departed from the common law
rule restricting rescission to contracting parties.3 9' Other commen-
tators speculated that although Congress was free to depart from
the common law rule, rescissory relief might prove ineffective against
many of the non-transferor defendants enumerated in section 11 (a).3 92
In response to this criticism, the 1934 Act amended section 11(e)
to eliminate rescissory relief and establish the present damage
remedy.3 93 The 1934 Act left section 12 untouched, a circumstance
consistent with the conclusion that the section imposes liability on
only the transferor.
388. Id. Section 11(e) provides in relevant part:
The suit authorized under subsection (a) of the section may be to recover
such damages as shall represent the difference between the amount paid
for the security (not exceeding the price at which the security was offered
to the public) and (1) the value thereof as of the time such suit was
brought, or (2) the price at which such security shall have been disposed
of in the market before suit, or (3) the price at which such security
shall have been disposed of after suit but before judgment if such damages
shall be less than the damages representing the difference between the
amount paid for the security (not exceeding the price at which the security
was offered to the public) and the value thereof as of the time such
suit was brought: Provided, That if the defendant proves that any portion
or all of such damages represents other than the depreciation in value
of such security resulting from such part of the registration statement,
with respect to which his liability is asserted, not being true or omitting
to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading, such portion of or all such
damages shall not be recoverable.
Id.
389. See 1933 Act, Pub. L. No. 22, §§ 11(e), 12, 48 Stat. 74, 83, 84 (1933).
390. See, e.g., James, The Securities Act of 1933, 32 MICH. L. REV. 624, 650
(1934); Comment, Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933, 32 MIcH. L. REV.
1130, 1134 (1934).
391. See, e.g., Ballantine, Amending the Federal Securities Act, 20 A.B.A. J.
85, 87 (1934). See supra notes 280-81 and accompanying text for discussion of the
common law rule.
392. See, e.g., Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J.
227, 231-32 (1933).
393. See 1934 Act, ch. 404, § 203(d), 48 Stat. 881, 907-908 (1934).
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Because sections 11 and 12 are closely related and not merely
contiguous, their significant contrasts cannot be dismissed as hap-
penstance. Section 11 authorizes and effectuates actions against ex-
pressly enumerated non-transferor defendants in a manner that section
12 could have emulated but did not. The significant contrasts support
the inference that the Act does not confer seller status on non-
transferors.
3. Policy Considerations
In the 1985 Landreth footnote,3 94 the Supreme Court stated that
"it is proper for a court to consider-as we do today-policy
considerations in construing terms in [the federal securities acts]."
When Landreth and its companion decision rejected the sale-of-
business doctrine, the Court approved a policy of enabling persons,
before engaging in business transactions, to determine with optimum
certainty whether their conduct implicates the federal securities acts.3 95
The majority stressed that the sale-of-business doctrine maximized
"uncertainties attending the applicability of the acts"'396 and en-
couraged "difficult questions of line-drawing ' 3 97 whose resolution
normally would "depend on findings of fact made by a court-often
only after extensive discovery and litigation."398
In Blue Chip99 a decade earlier, the Court intimated that policy
considerations might be influential when a court, after interpreting
the various sources of congressional intent, must choose between
competing constructions that each appear within the limits indicated
by these sources. Blue Chip approved a policy of avoiding "vexatious
litigation" by the adoption of readily ascertainable standards for
determining whether a person is within a securities remedy's litigant
class.4°° Because status as an actual purchaser or seller is "generally
... verifiable by documentation, ' 40' Blue Chip concluded that the
purchaser-seller limit on section 10(b)'s plaintiff class avoids "a
394. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 694-95 n.7 (1985). For
discussion of this case and a companion decision, Gould v. Reufenacht, 471 U.S.
701 (1985), see supra notes 191-92, 209-14, 218-32 and accompanying text.
395. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 696-97.
396. Id. at 696.
397. Id.
398. Gould, 471 U.S. at 705.
399. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See supra
notes 183-85, 193-203, 233-39 and accompanying text for discussion of the case.
400. 421 U.S. at 740.
401. Id. at 742.
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shifting and highly fact-oriented disposition ' 40 2 that is not "a sat-
isfactory basis for a rule of liability imposed on the conduct of
business transactions. ' 4°3
It is this Article's thesis that section 12's pertinent legislative
materials, without more, are sufficient to establish that only the
transferor may incur liability under either of the section's two sub-
sections. Insofar as this thesis would preclude imposition of partic-
ipant liability based on the substantial-factor test, the thesis is
consistent with the policy considerations the Supreme Court artic-
ulated in Landreth, its companion decision, and Blue Chip.
As the Ninth Circuit recently acknowledged, " 'substantial par-
ticipation' is a concept without precise bounds." ' Participant lia-
bility depends on a determination of whether a defendant's activities
were a substantial factor in causing the underlying sale to take place,
a determination that generally requires line-drawing and may turn
on fine distinctions. 5 By considering the would-be participant's
402. Id. at 755.
403. Id.
404. SEC v. Rogers, 790 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986) (Commission enforcement
action alleging that defendant was substantial participant in violation of section 5
of 1933 Act).
405. Compare Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1360 (5th Cir. 1981) (lawyer
liable as section 12(2) seller because he was "key participant in the transaction")
with Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709, 714 (5th Cir. 1980) (lawyer not liable as
section 12(2) seller because "we cannot say that [his] participation in this transaction
proximately caused the plaintiffs' injury"; however, "[this conclusion should not
be interpreted to mean that a lawyer who participates in the transaction can never
be a seller for purposes of section 12. Each case naturally turns upon its own
facts"); see also SEC v. Rogers, 790 F.2d 1450, 1458 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[w]ere we
reviewing this case de novo, we might reach a different conclusion [concerning
substantial participation] based on the evidence presented . . . . but [we] must abide
by the clearly erroneous rule when reviewing a district court's findings"); Anderson
v. Aurotek, 774 F.2d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 1985) (section 12 substantial-factor test
"usually involves a question of fact for the jury"); Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677
F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982) (summary judgment in favor of section 12(2) cross-
defendant reversed because material issues of fact remained concerning "the extent
of [his] participation in the transaction"); Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 667 (5th
Cir. 1980) ("beyond the words 'substantial factor,' we have no guideposts other
than the factual situations presented in [precedent] to assist us in determining
whether to impose strict liability in a given case"); Scharp v. Cralin & Co., 617
F. Supp. 476, 478 (S.D. Fla. 1985) ("[a]t this stage of the discovery process, the
Court cannot say that the [alleged participant] is, or is not, deemed a seller under
§ 12(2)"); In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Sec. Litig., 76 F.R.D. 337, 349 (N.D.
Okla. 1975) (" 'participation' is a conclusory term and has little meaning without
the facts underlying such conclusion"); Sandusky Land, Ltd. v. Uniplan Groups,
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 440, 443 (N.D. Ohio 1975) ("each case must be determined
upon the facts which are established by the parties").
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motive in Dahl,4°6 the Fifth Circuit has factored yet more imprecision
into the formula. When liability rests on application of the sub-
stantial-factor test, the inherent imprecision enables plaintiffs to name
a wide range of defendants, subject to judicial factfinding. The result
is "a shifting and highly fact-oriented disposition," which Blue Chip
concluded is not "a satisfactory basis for a rule of liability imposed
on the conduct of business transactions. 40 7
B. Section 12 Aiding and Abetting Liability
Perhaps because seven circuits impose section 12 liability for sub-
stantial participation in a selling effort, 408 courts have not paid
significant attention to the question of whether secondary liability
may be imposed for aiding and abetting in section 12 actions.4 If
non-transferors were no longer subject to section 12 liability as
sellers, however, purchasers could be expected to sue some non-
transferors as aider-abettors who had substantially assisted primary
violations. 41 0
The first decision approving imposition of aiding and abetting
liability under section 12 was In re Caesars Palace Securities Litigation,
406. Dahl v. Pinter, 787 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1985), rehearing en banc denied, 794
F.2d 1016 (1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1885 (1987). Dahl is discussed supra
notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
407. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 755; see supra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
409. The Commission and private plaintiffs have raised aiding and abetting claims
under various securities provisions, notably section 10(b) and Rule lob-5. See Fischel,
Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CAIF.
L. REv. 80, 83-85 (1981); Ruder, supra note 104, at 598 n.l. The Supreme Court
has expressly reserved decision on the question whether civil liability may be imposed
for aiding and abetting violations of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Her-
man & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.5 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 192 n.7 (1976). The Court has not discussed the question
whether aiding and abetting liability may be imposed in section 12 actions. For an
argument that courts may not impose secondary liability for aiding and abetting
securities violations, see Fischel, supra, passim.
410. Two commentators have written that "[n]o case has yet come up with a
very meaningful definition of aiding-abetting." 3 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra
note 104, § 8.5, at 530. Courts generally state three elements of an aiding and
abetting cause of action: (1) violation by the primary (as opposed to the aiding
and abetting) party; (2) the aider-abettor's knowledge of this primary violation;
and (3) substantial assistance by the aider-abettor in achieving the primary violation.
See, e.g., Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Flass, 754 F.2d 57, 62
(2d Cir. 1985); ITT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47-48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039
(1978). On the knowledge and substantial assistance elements generally, including
the question whether silence or inaction may support imposition of aiding and
abetting liability, see, e.g., HAZEN, supra note 106, at 208-10.
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in 1973."1 The plaintiffs alleged that in the sale of Caesars Palace to
Lum's Inc., certain defendants had aided and abetted section 12(2)
violations arising from dissemination of a registration statement and
prospectus that contained materially misleading information about
Caesars Palace's financial condition.4 1 2 Several defendants moved to
dismiss the section 12(2) count on the ground that they were not
within the category of persons covered by section 12. The court
denied the motion because "persons who do no more than . . . aid
and abet a violation ... are not necessarily excluded from ... section
12(2) liability. ' ' 413
Judge Weiner concluded that because courts had imposed aiding
and abetting liability in civil enforcement actions alleging violations
of sections 17(a) of the 1933 Act and 10(b) of the 1934 Act, "logic"
indicated that persons "should similarly be subject" to aiding and
abetting liability in actions under section 12.414 The court found
section 12 aiding and abetting liability to be consistent with "the
broad, remedial nature of the 1933 Act and the need to adopt a
liberal interpretation of the statute in order to best effectuate the
congressional purpose. ' 415 The court recognized the tort basis of
aiding and abetting liability by citing section 876 of the Restatement
of Torts. 41 6
Courts have not accorded section 12 aiding and abetting liability
the same degree of positive reception that they have accorded par-
ticipant liability. The Second Circuit has approved imposition of
aiding and abetting liability in a section 12 action,'41 but the Fifth
and Eighth circuits have held that aiding and abetting liability may
not be imposed under section 12.418 The law remains uncertain in
411. 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
412. Id. at 378 & n.8.
413. Id. at 378.
414. Id. at 381.
415. Id. at 382-83.
416. Id. at 380 n. 11 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939) ("Persons Acting
in Concert")). On the tort basis of aiding and abetting liability generally, see, e.g.,
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 70, § 46, at 323 & n.9; Prosser, Joint Torts and
Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413, 429-30 & n.109 (1937). Aiding and abetting
is also grounded in criminal law. See, e.g., R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL
LAW 722-25, 767-69 (3d ed. 1982); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1982) ("[w]hoever
commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands,
induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal").
417. See Mayer v. Oil Sys. Corp., 803 F.2d 749, 756 (2d Cir. 1986) (section
12(2)).
418. See Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 1981); Huddleston v.
Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 551 n.27 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709,
713 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980).
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the Third Circuit. 41 9 In circuits in which the question of section 12
aiding and abetting remains open, district courts are closely divided. 420
The Supreme Court has not determined whether civil liability may
be imposed for aiding and abetting securities violations. 421 The out-
come under such provisions as section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and
section 10(b), however, does not necessarily determine the outcome
under section 12. The former sections are general antifraud provisions
that operate against specified conduct but do not expressly state the
types of persons who may be defendants. On the other hand,
Congress specifically imposed section 12 liability on only a person
who sells a security.4 22
This Article's focus has been on the scope of seller liability imposed
by section 12. The Article's analysis, however, provides support for
the conclusion that courts may not impose secondary liability for
aiding and abetting in actions under either subsection of the section.
The section's language imposes liability on sellers and provides no
indication of congressional intent to impose liability on anyone else,
including aider-abettors. The section's legislative history makes no
mention of aiding and abetting liability. In this context, the legislative
scheme and the 1933 Act's regulatory antecedents once again become
instructive.
419. In Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. First Pa. Bank, N.A. v. Monsen, 439 U.S. 930 (1978), the jury
found the Bank "liable as an aider-abettor to Consolidated for its securities vi-
olations." 579 F.2d at 798-99. According to the panel, "Consolidated committed
underlying securities violations of sections 12(1) & 12(2) of the 1933 Act and of
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act." Id. at 801. A year later, a different panel rejected
section 12 participant liability without reaching the question of whether aiding and
abetting liability may be imposed under the section. The latter panel's dictum stated
that Monsen had not "specifically discuss[ed] whether there can be aider-abettor
liability under section 12(2) as distinguished from § 10(b), on which the jury's
verdict also rested." Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1979).
420. In these circuits, district court decisions approving section 12 aiding and
abetting liability include Kilmartin v. H.C. Wainwright & Co., 637 F. Supp. 938,
944 (D. Mass. 1986) (section 12(2)); In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 116
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (same); Stern v. American Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818,
824 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (same); Sandusky Land, Ltd. v. Uniplan Groups, Inc., 400
F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (same). District court decisions rejecting section
12 aiding and abetting liability in these circuits include Riordan v. Smith Barney,
Harris Upham & Co., No. 84 C 3216 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) (section 12(2)); In re Activision Sec. Lltig., 621 F. Supp. 415,
421-22 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (same); Beck v. Cantor, Fitzgerald & Co., 621 F. Supp.
1547, 1562 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (same).
421. See supra note 409.
422. For argument that aiding and abetting liability may not be imposed under
section 12 even if it may be imposed under provisions such as sections 17(a) and
10(b), see HAZEN, supra note 106, at 210-11.
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By early 1933 the Uniform Act and the blue sky laws of eleven
states and the territory of Hawaii had created private rights of action
that expressly imposed primary liability on the seller and on persons
who "aided in any way in making [a] sale" of securities fraudulently
or in violation of registration requirements. 423 Section 15 of the 1933
423. See supra notes 292, 294 and accompanying text. The blue sky laws of 43
states and the District of Columbia presently create private rights of action that
expressly impose primary liability for aiding, aiding and abetting, or assisting in
securities violations. See ALA. CODE § 8-6-19(b) (1975) ("every employee . . .who
materially aids in the sale and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in
the sale"); ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.220(c) (1986) (same); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-
1256(b) (1980) (same); CAL. CoRnP. CODE § 25504 (West 1977) (same); id. § 25504.1(West Supp. 1987) ("[any person who materially assists in any violation of"
securities laws); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 11-51-125(5)(a) (Supp. 1984) ("every employee
... who materially aids in the sale .... and every broker or dealer who materially
aids in the sale"); id. § 11-51-125(5)(b) ("lalny person who ... gives substantial
assistance to a person who is liable"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-498(b) (West
1981) ("every employee . . .who materially aids in the sale and every broker-dealer
or agent who materially aids in the sale"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7323(b) (1975)(same); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-2613(b) (1981) (same); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.211(1)
(West Supp. 1987) ("every director, officer, partner, or agent of or for the seller
[who] has personally ... aided in making the sale"); id. § 517.211(2) (same);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 485-20(a) (1985) ("every director, officer, or agent of or for
the seller [who] has personally . . . aided in any way in making the sale"); IDAHO
CODE § 30-1446(2) (1980) ("every broker-dealer or salesman who ... materially
aids in the sale"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.13(A) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1987) ("each underwriter, dealer or salesperson who shall have ... aided in any
way in making [the] sale"); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-19(b) (Burns 1984) ("every
employee ... who materially aids in the sale .... and every broker-dealer or
agent who materially aids in the sale"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.503(1) (West Supp.
1987) ("persons (whether employees . . .or otherwise) who materially aid and abet
in the act or transaction .... and broker-dealers or agents who materially aid
and abet in the act or transaction"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1268(b) (1981 & Supp.
1986) ("every partner, officer, or director ... or employee ... who materially
aids in the sale, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale");
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.480(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981) (same); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10605(3) (Supp. 1986) ("every employee ... who materially
aids in the act or transaction ... and every broker-dealer or sales representative
who materially aids in the act or transaction"); MD. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN.
§ 11-703(c) (1985) ("every employee ... who materially aids in the sale .... and
every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale"); MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 110A, § 410(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (same); MicH. Comp'. LAWS ANN. § 451.810(b)
(West 1967 & Supp. 1987) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80A.23(3) (West 1986)
("every employee ... who materially aids in the act or transaction . . . , and
every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the act or transaction"); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 75-71-719 (Supp. 1987) ("every employee ... who materially aids
in the sale, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale");
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.411(b) (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1987) (same); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 30-10-307(2) (1985) ("every broker-dealer or salesman who ... materially
aids in the sale"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1118(2) (1983) ("every partner, officer, or
director ... or employee ... who materially aids in the sale, and every broker-
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Act expressly imposes secondary liability based on a person's control
relationship with a liable section 12 defendant but on no other
basis .424
The legislative scheme and the 1933 Act's regulatory antecedents
thus demonstrate that when Congress considered the Act's private
dealer, issuer-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale"); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 90.200(2) (1985) ("an employee .. .who materially aids in the sale, and a broker
or dealer or employee of a broker or dealer who materially aids in the sale");
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:25(III) (1983) ("every employee ...who materially
aids in the act or transaction . . . , and every broker-dealer or agent who materially
aids in the acts or transactions"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-71(b) (West 1970 &
Supp. 1987) ("every employee ... who materially aids in the sale, and every
broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-
13B-40(F) (1986) ("an employee ... [who] materially aids in the act, omission or
transaction . . . and a broker-dealer or sales representative who materially aids in
the act, omission or transaction"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-56(c) (1985) ("every
employee ... who materially aids in the act or transaction, and every dealer or
salesman who materially aids in the sale"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-17 (1985)
("every director, officer, salesman, or agent of or for [the] seller who shall have
... aided in any way in making [the] sale"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43
(Anderson 1985) ("every person who has . . .aided the seller in any way in making
[the] sale or contract for sale"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 408(b) (West 1987)
("[every person who materially ... aids in a sale"); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3)
(1985) ("every person who ... materially aids in the sale"); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-1500 (Law. Co-op. 1987) ("every employee ... who materially aids in the
sale, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale"); S.D.
CODrFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-31-133 (1983) ("each underwriter, broker or agent who
shall have . . .aided in any way in making [the] sale, and . . .each of its officers
and directors ... who shall have ... aided in making [the] sale"); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-2-122(g) (1984) ("every employee . . .who materially aids in the act or
transaction . . . , and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the act
or transaction"); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(F)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1987)
("[a] person who directly or indirectly with intent to deceive or defraud or with
reckless disregard for the truth or the law materially aids a seller ... or issuer
of a security"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-22(2) (1986) ("every employee . . .who
materially aids in the sale . . . , and every broker-dealer or agent who materially
aids in the sale"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4225 (1984) ("every director, officer
or agent of or for [the] seller who shall have ... aided in any way in making
[the] sale"); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-522(c) (Supp. 1987) ("every employee ...who
materially aids in the conduct . . . , and every broker-dealer, investment advisor,
investment advisor representative or agent who materially aids in the conduct");
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.430(3) (Supp. 1987) ("every employee . . .who
materially aids in the transaction, and every broker-dealer, salesperson, or [exempt]
person . . .who materially aids in the transaction"); W. VA. CODE § 32-4-410(b)
(1982) ("every employee ... who materially aids in the sale, and every broker-
dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 551.59(4)
(West 1982) ("every employe [sic] . . .who materially aids in the act or transaction
.... and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the act or transaction");
WYo. STAT. § 17-4-122(b) (1987) ("every employee ... who materially aids in the
sale, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale").
424. See 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982), quoted fully and discussed supra note 229.
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liability provisions, the lawmakers knew that primary or secondary
liability might be imposed for aid given to a seller. In this context,
Congress' failure expressly to impose liability for aiding a section
12 seller supports the inference that Congress did not intend that
such liability be imposed. Together with section 12's language,
this inference provides support for the conclusion that aiding and
abetting liability may not be imposed in section 12 actions. The
inference is consistent with the Supreme Court's determination that
Congress did not intend to impose securities liability based on tort
principles .425
IV. Denouement: Section 12 Liability Does not Extend to Participants
or Other Non-Transferors
Congress did not intend to impose section 12 liability for "par-
ticipating" in a selling effort, no matter how courts might determine
participation and no matter what an alleged participant's motive
might have been. Section 12's language yields no indication of
congressional intent to impose liability for participation, and the
section's legislative history makes no mention of participation. In
the face of this silence, the securities acts' legislative scheme and
the 1933 Act's regulatory antecedents become instructive.
As section 12 did four years later, the 1929 Uniform Sale of
Securities Act created private rights of action for fraudulent sales
of securities or sales in violation of registration requirements. The
Uniform Act expressly imposed liability on the seller and on persons
who "personally participated" with the seller in making a sale. By
early 1933 the blue sky laws of twelve states and the territory of
Hawaii had created private rights of action that expressly imposed
liability on persons who "participated" in making fraudulent or
violative sales. Liabilities and obligations expressly grounded in par-
ticipation are found elsewhere in the 1933 Act and in four of the
later five Roosevelt administration securities acts. Section 9 of the
1934 Act, enacted by the same Congress that enacted the 1933 Act,
creates a private right of action that expressly imposes liability on
participants.
The legislative scheme and the 1933 Act's regulatory antecedents
thus demonstrate that Congress knew of the participation concept
and employed it in that Act and throughout the unified program
of securities regulation. In this context, section 12's failure expressly
425. See supra notes 258-66 and accompanying text.
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to impose liability for participation supports the inference that Con-
gress did not intend that the section impose participant liability.
Section 12's pertinent legislative materials also establish that the
section imposes liability on only the person who transfers title to
or other interest in the security for value. The Act's language
indicates, but does not conclusively establish, this outcome. The
Act's legislative history does not shed light on who may be a seller.
Section 11, however, authorizes and effectuates actions by "any
person acquiring [the] security" against a wide array of expressly
enumerated defendants, including most of the major non-transferors
involved in registered offerings. These non-transferors are frequently
among the persons named as "participants" in section 12 actions.
Section 12 could have provided a similar express enumeration but
instead provides that "[a]ny person who offers or sells a security
... shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from
him." Section 11 thus creates a legislative scheme whose contrasts
with section 12 support the inference that the Act does not impose
seller status on non-transferors.
Perhaps because seven circuits impose section 12 liability for sub-
stantial participation in a selling effort, courts have not paid sig-
nificant attention to the question of whether liability may be imposed
for aiding and abetting in section 12 actions. If non-transferors were
no longer subject to section 12 liability as sellers, however, purchasers
could be expected to sue some non-transferors as aider-abettors who
had substantially assisted primary violations. The Article's analysis
provides support for the conclusion that courts may not impose
liability under section 12 for aiding and abetting a seller's section
5 violation or its offer or sale of a security by means of a materially
misleading prospectus or oral communication.
V. Conclusion
Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 creates two private rights
of action, each providing in relevant part that "[a]ny person who
offers or sells a security ... shall be liable to the person purchasing
such security from him . . "426 Because suit may be maintained
only by the person who purchases the security from defendant, an
offeror may incur section 12 liability only if the offeror also "sells"
the security to the plaintiff. At the least, section 12 imposes liability
on the person who transfers title to or other interest in the security
for value. Since 1971, however, seven circuits have adopted the
participation theory. Courts adopting this theory impose liability not
426. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982), quoted fully supra text accompanying note 268.
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only on the transferor, but also on any person whose participation
in the transferor's selling effort makes the person's activities a
substantial factor in causing the underlying transaction to take place.
The participation theory is derived from Lennerth v. Mendenhall,
a 1964 district court decision. Except for stating the conclusion that
the theory is consistent with the securities acts' "liberal remedial
spirit," Lennerth did not base the theory on interpretation of section
12's pertinent legislative materials. '27 Except for embracing Lennerth's
conclusion concerning the securities acts' remedial purposes, the seven
circuits in turn have not based the theory on interpretation of these
materials .421
This Article has interpreted section 12's pertinent legislative ma-
terials and has presented the thesis that the section does not impose
liability on participants or other non-transferors. The Article's anal-
ysis also provides support for the conclusion that courts may not
impose secondary liability for aiding and abetting under section 12.
Because transactions in registered and unregistered securities are
frequently effected by non-transferors with the transferor playing
only a nominal role, limiting section 12 liability to the transferor
would significantly diminish the protections afforded by the 1933
Act. Brokers and other non-transferors who play substantial roles
in selling efforts would no longer be subject to section 12 liability
in connection with section 5 violations or offers or sales of securities
by means of materially misleading prospectuses or oral communi-
cations. The transferor might prove insolvent or otherwise unable
to satisfy the injured plaintiff's judgment.
The defect lies in the statute itself, a circumstance that recalls the
Second Circuit's 1967 suggestion in Barnes v. Osofsky. 429 The panel
rejected the claim that the plaintiff class created by section 11(a)
of the 1933 Act 430 includes some persons who could not trace their
securities to the offering covered by the materially misleading reg-
istration statement. The panel recognized that its construction of
section 11 (a) might deny relief to some injured persons, but it declined
to "depart from the more natural meaning" indicated by the various
sources of congressional intent.431 Writing for the panel, Judge Henry
J. Friendly suggested that "the time may have come for Congress
to reexamine [the 1933 and 1934 acts] in the light of thirty years'
experience. ' ' 432 Similarly, section 12's reach should be determined
427. See supra notes 10-13, 49-56 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 57-98 and accompanying text.
429. 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967).
430. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1982).
431. 373 F.2d at 273.
432. Id.
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by congressional reexamination based on deliberative study. The focus
should be on the scope of liability that best effectuates the securities
acts' investor-protection purposes in light of the complexity and
variety that characterize present-day securities transactions. Liability
should no longer be determined by judicial implication based on a
theory that is inconsistent with the section's pertinent legislative
materials.
